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ABSTRACT
Medical devices have been used in HealthCare for years. Such devices trans-
form the way clinical operations are being performed, rendering care both
more efficient and more effective. Equipped with advanced sensors and pre-
cision electronics, they can collect physiological measurements of patients in
real-time and administer drugs or act on the human body in response. For
example, a blood pressure cuff [1] can control the rate by which infusion
pumps IP [2] can deliver pulses of the infused material at precision levels in
the order of milliliters or even nanoliters. We have discovered multiple issues
with infusion pumps where an adversary is able to attack and modify the
nature of the device.
Further, we discovered that some devices such as patient monitor [3] and
infusion pump are directly interacting, and often the output of one device is
the input for the other device. In this case, if the patient monitor has been
compromised and sends faulty outputs to the infusion pump, the end result
will cause the patient to lose his/her life due to having a bad source of input.
This scenario demonstrates that how networked devices in an emergency
room can generate a collection of faulty systems. Thus, they will cause
damage (1) to other devices in the room and (2) they will put the patient
life at risk.
To help with this problem, we are proposing a Distributed Record and
Replay system formally known as DRnR. The purposed system will facili-
tate with identifying the compromised and or faulty medical device in an
Emergency Room ER setting. The technology is target to solve two sets or
problems (1) identifying the exact stage and cause of the device misbehavior
(2) educating the medical staff with replaying a specific scenario.
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”Live as if you were to die tomorrow. Learn as if you were to live forever.”
Mahatma Gandhi
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Problem Statement
Medical devices have been used in HealthCare for years. Such devices trans-
form the way clinical operations are being performed, rendering care both
more efficient and more effective. Equipped with advanced sensors and pre-
cision electronics, they can collect physiological measurements of patients in
real-time and administer drugs or act on the human body in response. For
example, a blood pressure cuff [1] can control the rate by which infusion
pumps [2] can deliver pulses of the infused material at precision levels in
the order of milliliters or even nanoliters. Such a task would be at the very
least unreliable to perform by a human. However, in the case such a device
takes or delivers a wrong measurement or administers not correct dosage, it
can entail lethal repercussions to the patient [6]. Implantable Cardioverter
Defibrillators is another class of widely used medical devices. These are im-
planted in the subjects body or stationed in close proximity to it. Their main
purpose is to perform cardioversion, defibrillation and pacing of the heart.
Emergency rooms are equipped with such devices. These commonly fall
under the category of embedded systems, since they either do not employ a
user interface or if they do, it is simplistic and tailored to their particular
functionality. Furthermore, they tend to run on hardware and software that
it also specific to the task the device is commissioned to perform. Manufac-
turers of such devices tend to focus on the precision and real-time guarantees
the device can offer in such time-critical environments. Unfortunately, this
comes at the expense of security. The main reason for that, is because tradi-
tionally these devices are accessed only by medical practitioners. As a result,
the threat model during the design phase of embedded medical devices, does
not typically include a remote adversary or a stronger adversary with physi-
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Table 1.1: Event Log of the Alaris IV infusion pump at OSF St Francis
Medical Center in Peoria, IL during March 2015
Log Date Description Details
3/13/2015, 10:39:21 AM EXTERNAL CONTROL EVENT EventID = BINARY LOG REQUEST
3/13/2015, 10:39:19 AM EXTERNAL CONTROL EVENT EventID = BINARY LOG REQUEST
3/13/2015, 10:39:19 AM EXTERNAL CONTROL EVENT EventID = BINARY LOG REQUEST
3/13/2015, 10:38:45 AM FORM REQUEST Form = NEW PATIENT;
3/13/2015,10:38:45 AM FORM REQUEST Form = MAINTENANCE MODE;
3/13/2015 10:38:36 AM AVA EVENT PCU SourceType = POWER MANAGEMENT;
3/13/2015 10:38:33 AM CI BOARD DETECTED SoftwareVersion= 9.12.1.2;
3/13/2015 10:38:33 AM ACTIVATE PAGE PageID=0
3/13/2015 10:38:33 AM FORM REQUEST Form = NEW PATIENT;
3/13/2015 10:38:30 AM POWERED ON PCU SerialNumber = 13372937;
3/13/2015 10:38:00 AM POWERED OFF
3/13/2015 10:38:00 AM SHUTDOWN COMPLETE HeapAllocated = 158169; HeapTotal = 0
3/13/2015 10:38:00 AM KEYPRESS PCU Key= KEY SOFT 12; Valid = True
3/13/2015 10:38:00 AM KEYPRESS IGNORED PCU KeyCode = KEY SOFT 12
3/13/2015 10:38:00 AM KEYPRESS PCU Key = KEY SOFT 12; Valid = True
3/13/2015 10:38:00 AM ACTIVATE PAGE PageID = 1
3/13/2015 10:38:00 AM KEYPRESS PCU Key = KEY SOFT 12; Valid = True
3/13/2015 10:37:51 AM ACTIVATE PAGE PageID = 4
3/13/2015 10:37:51 AM KEYPRESS PCU Key = KEY SOFT 12; Valid = True
3/13/2015 10:37:51 AM ACTIVATE PAGE PageID = 8
3/13/2015 10:37:51 AM FORM REQUEST Form = MN DISPLAY ERROR LOG;
3/13/2015 10:37:51 AM KEYPRESS PCU Key = KEY SOFT 12; Valid = True
3/13/2015 10:37:50 AM ACTIVATE PAGE PageID = 0
3/13/2015 10:37:50 AM KEYPRESS PCU Key = KEY SOFT 12; Valid = True
3/13/2015 10:37:06 AM ACTIVATE PAGE PageID = 1
3/13/2015 10:37:05 AM KEYPRESS PCU Key = KEY SOFT 1; Valid = True
3/13/2015 10:37:04 AM ACTIVATE PAGE PageID = 0
3/13/2015 10:37:04 AM FORM REQUEST Form = MN DISPLAY ERROR LOG;
3/13/2015 10:37:04 AM KEYPRESS PCU Key = KEY SOFT 1; Valid = True
3/13/2015 10:37:03 AM ACTIVATE PAGE PageID = 8
3/13/2015 10:37:03 AM KEYPRESS PCU Key = KEY SOFT 3; Valid = True
3/13/2015 10:36:44 AM ACTIVATE PAGE PageID = 4
3/13/2015 10:36:44 AM KEYPRESS PCU Key = KEY SOFT 2; Valid = True
3/13/2015 10:36:30 AM KEYPRESS PCU Key = KEY SOFT 12; Valid = True
3/13/2015 10:36:13 AM AVA EVENT PCU SourceType = POWER MANAGEMENT;
3/13/2015 10:36:11 AM CI BOARD COMM ESTABLISHED
3/13/2015 10:36:10 AM CI BOARD DEVICE INFO ModelNumber = 8015; SerialNumber = 0
3/13/2015 10:36:10 AM CI BOARD DETECTED SoftwareVersion = 9.12.1.2;
3/13/2015 10:36:10 AM ACTIVATE PAGE PageID = 0
3/13/2015 10:36:10 AM KEYPRESS ILLEGAL KeyCode = KEY TAMPER SWITCH
cal or proximity access to the device. We argue that this premise is fallacious
especially with the recent advancements on the Internet of Things. Increas-
ingly, medical devices become interconnected and interdependent. Prime ex-
ample of this, is the inter-connectivity between medical devices and clinical
systems[7].
In essence, such advances introduce new attack surfaces: the software of
the devices becomes more complex to support interactions with other devices;
the device itself needs to implicitly trust the inputs of other devices in the dis-
tributed medical operation system. At the same time, there exist the threat
of insiders: one with physical or proximity access to those devices could pur-
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posefully tamper with them. In fact, researchers at the University of Illinois
and the University of Michigan [8] have demonstrated that one could inject
radio frequency pulses to the Analog to Digital Converted (ADC) component
of an infusion pump and rendered it inoperable. Rushanan et. al. [9] found
vulnerabilities with the firmware of popular infusion pumps that are actively
being utilized by hospitals across the country that allowed one to tamper
with the dosage levels the pump was administering. Another report stated
that 56,000 adverse event reports have been linked to issues with infusion
pumps [6]. Halperin et. al. demonstrated vulnerabilities with Implantable
Cardioverter Defibrillators(ICD) [10]. In all cases, it is impossible for device
vendors or medical personnel to reason about the origin of the attack.
In this research we argue that medical devices should be enhanced with
record and replay capabilities to enable such analyses. Medical devices al-
ready log local events. Table 1.1 illustrates an excerpt of an event log file of
the Alaris IV infusion pump at the OSF St Francis Medical Center in Peoria,
IL. It is evident that events are logged in a coarse granularity (e.g. on second
granularity) and the focus is on outcomes (e.g. infusion pump administered
drug). This limits an analyst’s capability of determining erroneous system
behavior. In this work we aim to equip such devices with record and re-
play capabilities that can capture every system call invoked during a medical
procedure.
In fact there is a variety of systems proposed for record and replay [11, 12,
13, 14, 15, 16, 5, 17]. However, we believe that the traditional isolated record
and replay capabilities employed on individual devices is not enough since it
can only support local queries. Consider for example the following scenario: a
patient monitor device PM is connected to a patient in the emergency room.
At the same time an infusion pump IP is also connected to the patient. A
nurse is observing output values of the PM and inputs input values to the IP.
At a point, the PM reports a bad value which the nurse translates to a bad
input to the IP. In turn the IP administers the wrong dosage to the patient
causing her death. Assuming record and replay on the devices that took
place on the operation, a forensic investigation would involve interviewing
the nurse, watching a video of the operation and replaying the individual
devices. Thus we purpose a Distributed Record and Replay platform in
section 1.2.
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1.2 Our Approach
As explained in section 1.1 the flow of recording and replaying a single ma-
chine is a cumbersome process that also depends on human factors. With
Distributed Record and Replay, an investigator could input the global time
of death and trace backwards all the events on all the participating devices.
This would simplify the process and provide more trustworthy results. A
good analogy of this is the blackbox of an airplane that can be analyzed
in the case of an unfortunate event. We aim to design the blackbox of the
emergency operating room.
We pose that the answer to this problem is a distributed record and replay
framework for medical devices. In this work, we design, implement and eval-
uate such a framework. In our framework, each medical device is equipped
with local record and replay capabilities, but also synchronizes with the en-
tire distributed system. This allows a replay mechanism, to deterministically
replay all the devices, capturing their interdependencies and order of events.
This would enable (1) doctors and hospital administrators to determine the
cause of a non-expected event in the operating room at a high-level and (2)
device vendors and forensic analysts to determine whether a device, and in
particular which device, was the culprit.
The following outlines the contribution of this work:
•We design new techniques (and apply known techniques) to ensure synchro-
nized recording for distributed medical devices in the emergency operating
room.
• We design and evaluate a novel token mechanism for replaying distributed
events in an orderly fashion.
•We are the first to design, implement and evaluate a distributed record and
replay system that can be leveraged by doctors, device vendors and forensic
analysts to synchronously replay devices that participated in a medical op-
eration. Our system can be used for training doctors and readily detecting
causal events in the emergency room.
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1.3 Validation
In order to validate our ambitious design, first we had to determine the design
and structure of the targeted medical device, in specific we choose infusion
pumps. During this process, we had the following goals in mind.
1. Getting familiar with infusion pump’s design
2. Identifying vulnerabilities:
• Firmware attack.
• RF injection attack.
• Acoustic attack.
3. Researching existing security solutions for IPs.
4. Proposing an approach to help identifying vulnerabilities.
1.3.1 Hardware or software, which one is vulnerable?
To answer the above question we started our research based on an Alaris
7100 IP (shown in figure 1.1) We initiated our approach to the IP first by
reading its user manual [18]. The first gate of entry for us was to understand
the pump using the following technical documentation:
1.3.2 Main PCB 1
Processor Kernel
The processor kernel is responsible for controlling the motor actuation, send-
ing and responding to user input, monitoring various system sensors, and
performing start-up and on-going system operational testing. The kernel is
based on a 16 bit 90C188 microprocessor U11 (u15), 512K Bytes of EPROM
program storage, and 64K Bytes of battery backed up RAM data storage.
In addition, the kernel has 2K bits of EEPROM memory and a 9600 baud
serial communication interface.
1Some information on this page are directly from the vendor’s technical documentation.
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Figure 1.1: Alaris 7100 IP
Figure 1.2: Alaris 8015 IP
The COMBO IC U10 (U14) is a custom ASIC (Application Specific In-
tegrated Circuit) which incorporates timing, address decoding, digital I/O,
and other system ”glue” functions. The Combo IC has a 16 bit CRC gen-
erator which is used to periodically test the EPROM data. The COMBO
IC also contains the local serial interface control logic used to interface the
serially accessed peripheral such as the A/D, EEPROM, LED Module(s),
and Battery Manager.
The kernel data communications function supports RS-232 level serial
communications up to 9600 baud. The UART function is embedded in the
COMBO IC, while the rs-232 interface is based on an industry standard RS-
232 level converter chip. The communications channel is EMI filtered and
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ESD protected to 10 kV with components on the RS-232/Nurse Call board
and is not electrically isolated. The interface supports two signals(TxD and
RxD) along with ground [18].
Figure 1.3: Alaris 7100 Main PCB Block
The above description gave us an idea of how to communicate with the
device via RS-232 port. Not to our surprise no authentication mechanism was
applied on the device, thus we were able to establish basic communications
with the device in a very short period. Our initial goal was to connect to
the IP via the RS-232 management port to achieve the following (1)download
the firmware from this device (2)modify the firmware (3)upload the malicious
firmware back to the device. Unfortunately, this approach failed due to the
limitation of the interface port on this specific model(Alaris 7100). Initially,
the interface was designed to only download certain information from the
device, for example, the battery logs or power cycles. In order for us to
have a more realistic idea of an IP we shifted our focus on a newer model,
namely the most used IP in the HealthCare system, Alaris 8015 (shown
in figure 1.2). The mentioned model provided more capabilities such as
extensive user interface, Internet connectivity(via wire and wireless), as well
as an RS-232 port for immediate connectivity. Due to our understating from
the previous model, we promptly realized that communication in this model
via RS-232 is limited to specific software from Alaris2. Thus next step for us
2The newer model followed a better security practice when using an RS-232.
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was to download the firmware via hot plugging the memory unit, beneficial
to us, this task was previously being experienced by our grant partner Paul
Martin at John Hopkins University on an Alaris 7100.
Figure 1.3 provides an overview of the main board of the IP (Alaris 7100)
where Paul Martin was able to apply his hot plugging and download the
firmware.
Applying the same technique on Alaris 8015 allowed us to capture the
firmware and gather the following information:
1. The specific pump was running a modern operating system.
2. This specific model was using a light weight version of Linux named
Yocto.
3. The application for the IP was mainly written in C.
4. Updating the firmware was taking place via UART (Universal asyn-
chronous receiver/transmitter).
(1)Yocto Linux
From the Yocto project: The Yocto project through the OpenEmbedded
build system provides an open source development environment targeting
the ARM, MIPS, PowerPC, and x86 architectures for a variety of platforms
including x86-64 and emulated ones [4].
Highlights for the Yocto Project:
• Provides a recent Linux kernel along with a set of system commands
and libraries suitable for the embedded environment.
• Makes available system components such as X11, GTK+, Qt, Clut-
ter, and SDL (among others) so you can create a rich user experience
on devices that have display hardware. For devices that do not have
a display or where you wish to use alternative UI frameworks, these
components need not be installed.
• Creates a focused and stable core compatible with the OpenEmbedded
project with which you can easily and reliably build and develop.
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• Fully supports a wide range of hardware and device emulation through
the Quick EMUlator (QEMU).
• Provides a layer mechanism that allows you to easily extend the system,
make customizations, and keep them organized.
Figure 1.4 shows the development environment of Yocto. Shortly we were
able to identify numerous vulnerabilities in the IP. These vulnerabilities were
primarily caused by an out of date software(hint, such devices are still re-
quired to be sent to the manufacturers for the software update, in rare cases
technicians at the HealthCare facility can do an on-site firmware update), in
specific we were able identify multiple buffer-overflows among other Linux
kernel related vulnerabilities.
Not to our surprise, such system lacks security mechanisms and in spe-
cific both software and the operating system provide no audit capabilities 3.
Further research on the firmware of Alaris 8015 indicated that manufactur-
ers have followed very basic security practices such as ASLR(Address Space
Layout Randomization) to protect the memory against buffer-overflow, yet
no auditing capabilities have been added.
(2)Infusion Pump Application
Further analysis of the application of the infusion pump revealed the following
information:
• Program organization and microcontroller memory constrains and their
structure
• Data types, constants, variables for every functionality
• Microcontroller registers/port addresses
• Operators: arithmetic, logical, shift
• Control structures: if, while, for and switch cases
• Interrupts routines
3Linux kernel provides very high-level logs.
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In our case, we were able to use the above information to modify the firmware
and integrate malicious codes inside the main function.
The application of the IP consist of multiple functions but the most signif-
icant ones are, Drug Library Update, Patient Data, Pump Status, and Local
Logs.
To answer our high-level question, we identified vulnerabilities both in
hardware and software of the researched device, thus the point of attack was
existing from every angle.
Figure 1.4: The Yocto Project Development Environment [4]
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND & RELATED WORK
2.1 Emergency Room
An advanced emergency room revolves around the patient. The most impor-
tant function of such room is to help the patient in different ways. Each emer-
gency room in minimum includes: a blood pressure monitor, a stethoscope
(checks on the patient to see if his/her heart is beating) cardiac monitor, a
defibrillator, oxygen tanks and nasal cannulas, an EKG machine (monitors
the normal behavior of the patients heart), a vital sign monitoring system,
an infusion pump (infuses fluids), an anesthesia machine(supports the ad-
ministration of anaesthesia).
2.1.1 Device Correlation in Emergency Room
An example of device correlation in an Emergency Room is as following:
After checking the patient in, the first device that needs to be plugged to the
patient is the vital sign monitoring system. This device is critical since it
provides the basic yet important information about the patient. Typically,
the infusion pump is the second important/critical device which needs to
be functional. In an advanced Emergency Room, the monitoring system
and infusion pump are communicating through the network, this correlation
allows the infusion pump to infuse pre-specified drugs to the patient in the
case where his vital signs arent normal.
2.1.2 Attack Scenario
For our attack scenario we are considering the following setup: A patient
with critical conditions has entered the Emergency Room, due to certain
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conditions (e.g., the device has actually been compromised by an adversary)
the monitoring system is having an abnormal reading of the patients heart
rate. This results in sending a signal to the infusion pump to infuse more
than normal amount of certain drug (e.g., Adenosine is used to normalize
the heart rate). Since the reading was faulty the infused amount will cause
the patient to enter the cardiopulmonary arrest (cardiac arrest). In this
scenario, a distributed record and replay system can help us to identify the
compromised device even if that specific device is not running anymore.
Firstly, the ability to replay both of these devices in parallel allows us to
identify the causing event and applying more forensics techniques to learn
about the specific vulnerability which has caused this issues. Secondly, we can
use the replay logs towards an educational purpose. Often in an Emergency
Room, medical staff do face an abnormal situation, this is either due to
medical device behavior or the special condition of the patient. Based on our
previous research and collaborations, we identified a need for a high-level
replay of device interaction in an Emergency Room in order to be able to
train the future medical staff.
Figure 2.1: Inside an advanced emergency room
2.2 Security in Medical Devices
Medical device security has become a hot topic in recent years. For example,
Halperin et al. [10] has done some categorization and organized requirements
to improve the safety and security of medical devices. The requirements for
the safety and utility goals are:
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1. Safety and utility goals
(a) Data access
(b) Data accuracy
(c) Device identification
(d) Configurability
(e) Updatable software
(f) Multi device coordination
(g) Auditable
(h) Resource efficient
2. Security and privacy goals
(a) Authorization
(b) Availability
(c) Device software and settings
(d) Device-existence privacy
(e) Device-type privacy
(f) Specific-device ID privacy
(g) Measurement and log privacy
(h) Bearer privacy
(i) Data integrity
However, recent innovations in health-related communication have been
improved, the focus is still on the subject of defense and not processing the
aftermath of an attack. Most of the research in this categories has been done
regarding categorizing the line of defense for the safety of the device [19]. Past
works have also been done on finding the vulnerabilities in such systems [11],
nonetheless, nothing has been implemented in the path of auditable devices.
2.2.1 Medical Devices Logs
Medical device logs are used for incident investigation, technical support,
monitoring patterns of usage and so on. Several researchers tried to detect
misuse or improve the security of medical device based on logs.
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Oladimeji et al. [20] analyzed logs from 58 infusion pumps and explored
issues on visualizing device logs to discover how devices are used or misused
in practice. Cauchi et al. [19] have shown the importance of using the logs
generated by each infusion pump, but the depth of each log will determine
how much information can be retrieved. As an example, basic information
such as battery replacement error or stock key can be used to conclude that
the battery was being drained because a key was stocked. They suggest
devices should record almost unlimited key press data, preferably including
timing information. Not only would this help analysis, but it would also help
in incident investigations.
• Devices should record almost unlimited key press data, preferably in-
cluding timing information. Not only would this help analysis,but it
would also help in incident investigations.
• We have shown that design criteria that reduce error rates and magni-
tudes (e.g., start on left, start on right) are sometimes independent of
empirical measures; in other words, some design decisions can be made
reliably without reference to empirical data.
• What appears to be similar user interfaces have considerable varia-
tion in behavior and performance. From a clinical point of view, this
should be unacceptable; from a software engineering point of view, the
apparent lack of analysis (prior to our work) seems surprising but
fortunately, in principle, it should be easy to fix using best practice,
including formal methods and our forms of analysis.
• Perhaps the most notable contribution is that the formal approach to
user interface analysis, in general, raises numerous critical design issues,
which are important to be addressed because the design choices have
a significant impact. This paper indicated how that can be done for
a particular class of user interface (5 key number entry), but similar
methods should be developed to cover the full range of user interfaces
in clinical use.
However, none of them consider the case that the applications or operating
systems could be compromised and reprogrammed by adversaries.
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2.3 Record and Replay
Deterministic record and replay have been widely studied on various plat-
forms. Whole-system record and replay allows reproduction of all low-level
system states such as register and memory addresses, and often relies on
processors [5, 13, 14] or virtual machines [11, 17]. Eidetic system [5] relies on
the record and replay function of Arnold, and can deterministically replay
a multiprocessor system. It divides the system into different groups of re-
playing processes, records the dependencies between these groups, and uses
model-based compression to reduce the overheads. ReTrace [17] uses the
deterministic replay technology of VMware hypervisor, and captures only
non-deterministic events to reduce time and space overheads. Mobile record
and replay such as VALERA [21] deals with the complicated environment
of smartphones. Instead of focusing on system calls, VALERA records and
replays sensor and network input, event schedules, and inter-app communi-
cations. Application-level record and replay [12, 22, 23, 24] records the states
of a single application instead of the whole system. This is often used for
debugging and profiling the application. For example, Bugnet [22] records
the initial architectural state, register and program counter updates, and all
load values used during execution.
Distributed record and replay focuses on the record and replay applications
in a distributed environment. For example, Friday [23] targets the problem
of debugging and profiling large-scale distributed applications. It considers
distributed problems such as routing consistency in overlay networks and
temporal state abnormalities caused by route flaps. Similarly, Jockey [24]
and Bugnet [22] can also be used in a distributed environment. Most of
these systems maintain a synchronized clock or a virtual logical clock to
achieve consistency in distributed report logs. However, maintaining such a
synchronized clock or logical clock is the biggest challenge in our problem.
2.3.1 Software-based vs. Hardware-based Record and Replay
Software-based approaches use software systems to record all sources of non-
determinism, such as network inputs or interrupts and use this information
to guide the software down to the same execution path during replay. The
advantage of software-based approaches is that they can run on legacy ma-
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chines without hardware support. But compared with hardware-based meth-
ods, software-based methods have lower efficiency and will generate a lot of
logs. Such performance slowdowns can restrict their applicability.
On the other hand, the advantage of hardware-based approaches is low
overhead on runtime and logging space. And they impose minimal intrusion
on the traced system. The disadvantages of hardware-based approaches, how-
ever, are that they require costly non-commodity hardware. Also, they focus
only on the hardware implementation of the basic primitives for recording
and, sometimes, replay. They do not address key issues such as how to sep-
arate software that is being recorded or replayed from software that should
execute in a standard manner or from other software that should be recorded
or replayed separately. This limitation is problematic because practical re-
play systems require much more than just efficient hardware for the basic
operations.
Record-and-replay systems strive for a trade-off between the cost of im-
plementation, performance, precision, and generality. The software-based
full-system replay we proposed in Even though we want to make our audit
platform general, our current targets are simple medical devices. To make our
platform more practical, we will also consider combining the software-based
approaches and hardware-assisted approaches to achieve better performance.
2.3.2 Arnold
In our experiment settings, we use Arnold, an eidetic computing platform to
record the states of devices in an Emergency Room. An eidetic computer
system refers to a system that provides the ability to recall any past state that
existed on the computer and provides the lineage of any byte in a current or
past state [5]. An eidetic computer system supports both backward queries
and forward queries. A backward query finds out where a particular state
comes from and can be used to identify the source of an anomaly event. A
forward query traces the outputs and current states that are derived from a
particular state and can be used to find out all the devices and measurements
influenced by an anomaly event.
Arnold uses deterministic record and replay on a user process level. This
enables Arnold to efficiently reproduce the architectural states of any user-
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level processes. The modified kernel in Arnold records all non-deterministic
states of a process, including the orders, return values, and modified addresses
of system calls; the timings and values of received signals; and the results
of system time queries. These recorded data are used to deterministically
replay a user process and answer queries about past states.
To improve efficiency, Arnold divides the system into replay groups, each
of which has several processes and can be replayed independently. Arnold
uses a dependency graph to track dependencies between replay groups. This
approach reduces the cost of answering a query because the system only
needs to replay processes related to the queried states.
To reduce space overhead, Arnold uses compression techniques including
model-based compression, duplicated file recording and cooperative replay.
These techniques minimize the size of data to be stored on disk. Experiments
show that Arnold only needs a 4TB hard drive to store all the recorded data
for 4 or more years of usage.
2.4 Synchronization in Tele-Immersion and other
Distributed Systems
In tele-immersion systems, it is important to synchronize multimedia data
collected from different sources. Such synchronization includes intra-stream
synchronization, inter-stream synchronization, and inter-destination synchro-
nization [25]. A lot of work has been done on achieving multi-tier synchro-
nization [26, 27, 28, 29] and on evaluation of synchronization in terms of user
experience [30] and quality of service [31].
Clock synchronization is also an important topic in other distributed sys-
tems such as power generation systems [32], and distributed real-time sys-
tems [33]. Probabilistic clock synchronization [34] achieves a bound on the
clock skew with a probability of invalidity associated with it. Although this
approach is suitable for real-time applications with soft deadlines, it is not
suitable for an Emergency Room environment. Another solution is to use
partially-ordered clock vectors [35]. This requires a causality dependence be-
tween events happened on different devices. This dependency is not clear for
some events on medical devices (e.g. measuring a pulse and measuring the
blood pressure). Some other approaches combine continuous synchronization
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with instantaneous synchronization [33], or need special hardware [36].
Huang et al. (2010) proposes TSync, a synchronization framework which
can effectively minimize the multi-stream sync skews in all tiers. In partic-
ular, they have developed the cooperative frame rate allocation scheme for
correlated multi-streams to facilitate their coordinated delivery [28]. Fig-
ure 2.2 overview’s TSync architecture [28].
Figure 2.2: TSync Overview
2.5 Clock Synchronization in WSN
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) are large-scale network of small, low-cost,
and low-power sensors. Each sensor has a specific task such as observing the
surrounding environment. Data collected by each sensor need to be aggre-
gated to a single, meaningful result. Therefore, synchronization between the
sensors is highly desirable [37]. Due to limited energy and bandwidth, clock
synchronization among sensors needs to be light-weight and efficient. Some
works use signals that can be received by all the sensors as a source of syn-
chronization [38, 39, 40]. For example, wearable sensors can use distinctive
gestures captured by camera to achieve synchronization [38]. Clock synchro-
nization can be divided into master-slave shown in figure 2.3 synchronization
and peer-peer shown in figure 2.4 synchronization [37]. In master-slave syn-
chronization, a time server is available and all sensors synchronize with the
time server [41]. In peer-peer synchronization, sensor nodes broadcast refer-
ence messages with their neighbors [42]. Our clock synchronization is similar
to the master-slave synchronization problem in WSN. However, we want to
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avoid using periodic clock correction with the time server due to the large
overhead of such protocol and limited resources on medical devices.
Figure 2.3: The architecture of master-salve clock synchronization
Figure 2.4: The architecture of peer-peer clock synchronization
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CHAPTER 3
REQUIREMENTS & DESIGN
3.1 Requirements
In minimum our design requires the following hardware and software:
• Hardware:
– X86 processor with at least 1.2 GHz of Processor Base Frequency
– 1 GB of RAM
– 250 MB of Storage
• Softwares:
– The 12.04.2 LTS Ubuntu Linux 32-bit distribution
– Modified Arnold [5](Omnipay) with different record capabilities
– Modified Arnold(Omnipay) with different replay capabilities
3.2 System Overview
Figure 3.1 presents the high-level design of our system. This system aims to
record an operation in the emergency room and replay it for forensic analysis
or educational purposes.
3.2.1 Design Goals
Our system is designed for the emergency room where safety critical devices
operate. Such devices take one of two major roles: active; and passive. An
active device is responsible to administer drugs or take an action on the pa-
tient whereas a passive device is connected to the patient with the purpose
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Figure 3.1: Distributed Record and Replay testbed
of taking measurements. For example, an infusion pump is connected to the
patient and its main goal is to administer precise dosages of a nutrient or
medication to the patient. A sphygmomanometer or blood pressure cuff ap-
plies pressure to a patients arm that facilitates measurement of the patients
blood pressure. The infusion pump and the sphygmomanometer are exam-
ples of active devices in the emergency room. On the other hand, a heart rate
monitor is placed usually on the patient’s finger and periodically takes mea-
surements of the patient’s heart rate. The latter is an example of a passive
device in the emergency room. In addition, there is a vision of connected
medical devices. That is, the industry and academia are now considering
situations where such medical devices would be able to communicate with
each other.
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The heterogeneity of such medical devices and the fact that they are man-
ufactured by different vendors generates the need for solutions that can help
vendors identify malfunctioned or compromised devices. Furthermore, physi-
cians are also interested in automated solutions that can help them analyze
an operation for educational purposes. This system is a distributed system
that aims to fulfill these needs. To achieve that it needs to take precise
recordings of system events on each of the medical devices in the emergency
room. More importantly, our design needs to be able to synchronize these
local events on a global timescale. For example, it should be able to help
device vendors and physicians to distinguish and identify events that caused
another event. Consider for example a scenario where an active device (A)
and a passive device (B) are connected to a patient. An anomalous or un-
explained reading by B could be caused by a malfunctioned of B or more
interestingly by an action of A. The platform should be able to help identify
events on A that happened before the spurious reading on B. Such informa-
tion could be critical in identifying the culprit.
3.2.2 DRnR Architecture
Figure 3.2 illustrates the high-level design of DRnR. Medical devices in the
emergency room (D1, D2, D3 in the figure), run a DRnR recording session
in parallel with their normal operation. The DRnR recording component
captures local system events such as system calls and updates a log file.
The DRnR local recording components also run a synchronization algorithm,
essential for ordering events in a global timeline. DRnR synchronization
can be configured to run either NTP or a projection protocol(see 3.3)
order the events across the DRnR distributed system. DRnR assumes the
presence of a Master device which facilitates synchronization. The Master
device is also responsible for merging the local logs at the end of an operation
(see 3.4.1) and for replaying the devices for analysis in an interactive manner.
DRnR enforces the ordered execution of the distributed events using a novel
token mechanism (see 3.4.3).
22
Figure 3.2: DRnR high-level architecture
3.3 Device Synchronization
DRnR needs to be able to synchronize events across medical devices. For
example, we need to know if a specific action of D1 on the patient happened
before D2 took a measurement from the patient. To this end, DRnR supports
two synchronization approaches: (1) using local NTP and (2) running a
projection protocol which projects all events to a master timeline.
3.3.1 Clock synchronization with NTP
DRnR has the capacity of using NTP (Network Time Protocol). DRnR em-
ploys a master-slave synchronization since there is already a dedicated device
for the replay operation. However, naive use of NTP that requires an exter-
nal NTP root server would entail allowing devices in the emergency room to
get Internet access. This would greatly increase the attack surface. In such
a scenario, one would need to include into the adversary model a remote
adversary, since even a small bug or other vulnerability can be potentially
exploited by a remote adversary to get access to the emergency room’s local
network and in extend further compromise other devices in the network. To
address this, DRnR uses a local NTP where all medical devices synchronize
with a local machine. Our prototype uses the replay machine as the server
NTP, but in theory, any machine could assume that role.
NTP clients, by default synchronize within a 64s(minimum) interval and
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gradually increase to 1024s(maximum). However, this could entail a large
enough clock drift that would make it hard to confidently order events at the
system call granularity. For example, a drift of 100ms on one machine during
the synchronization intervals, is too large as it can span multiple system calls
across machines. DRnR wraps Arnold’s record command at the clients, to
enable NTP synchronization with the Master clock every 10 seconds, which
allows it to minimize clock drift across machines.
that NTP synchronizes a node’s clock with the master by calculating that
node’s clock offset with respect to that of the master. In particular, if oreal
is the real offset of the client’s clock, ontp is the one calculated by NTP, L1
is the latency of sending a message from the client to the master, and L2 is
the latency of sending a message from the Master to the client, then it can
be shown that the error in the NTP offset calculation is upper bounded by
the network delay:
|oreal − ontp| < |L2−L12 | (3.1)
To guarantee ordering, the following must hold in the NTP case. Let:
eA = |oreal,A − ontp,A| (3.2)
be the error in the offset calculation at machine A, eB the error at machine B,
tA the global time an event is recorded at machine A and tB the global time
an event is recorded at machine B and tA < tB. Then NTP can guarantee
ordering if:
e1 + e2 < tB − tA (3.3)
This ensures thay when the clients are synchronized, the worst case combined
error is not enough for the two events to be ordered differently.
If the different between the offsets ontp on client nodes is large, then mul-
tiple recorded distributed system calls might be timestamped in the wrong
order. Thus it is critical to synchronize as frequently as possible to limit
the damage in the ordering caused by the clients’ clock drifts. Furthermore,
if the message delay is too large, then the error in the offset calculation at
each client can be very high also resulting in unordered events. For reliable
emergency room networks, DRnR offers the option of running a projection
protocol instead of NTP for distributed event ordering.
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3.3.2 Projection Protocol
Alternatively to clock synchronization, one could use vector timestamps to
logically order events. However, vector timestamps assume communication
across nodes/processes. In the emergency room, most devices act indepen-
dently and as such any local recording would be considered concurrent with
another devices local recordings. To address this problem, when DRnR is
configured to run the projection protocol for synchronization, it forced de-
vices to send control messages to a master device. The Master could be
chosen using Paxos among the existing devices in the emergency room. Al-
ternatively, the replay machine could assume that role. However, note that
sending DRnR messages to the Master after each event (local action, send
message) will not correctly order events. Another option is to send DRnR
messages on every local action, send message and receive message events.
DRnR optimizes this by reducing the number of DRnR messages. DRnRs
projection protocol is simple and elegant rendering it readily deployable and
practical. The high-level logic is summarized in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: DRnR Projection Protocol
if local recording then
send message to Master;
end
if received message from device then
send message to Master;
end
In essence, whenever a DRnR device records a local action, it sends a
DRnR message to the Master node that includes the following: the devices
vector timestamp and the devices unique DRnR id. A DRnR device node
also sends such a message whenever it receives a message from another DRnR
device node. The master DRnR node stores the DRnR messages it receives
in an append log. By doing this we ensure that events can be meaningfully
ordered when the operation is complete, by merging the individual devices
record logs an operation facilitated by the master append log. DRnR also
avoids sending messages on every send message event reducing the bandwidth
needed.
What this achieves is to project every device event to a single Master
timeline. For this projection to guarantee meaningful ordering of events in
the context of the emergency room, the following assumptions must hold:
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• Equal Network Latencies. DRnR assumes that the network latency
to deliver a message across devices is the same.
• Reliable Message Delivery. We assume that all DRnR messages
are delivered.
• CPS. DRnR as most cyber-physical systems, makes a Cyber Physical
System assumption. That is, it assumes the time it takes for a device
action on a patient to instigate a physiological reaction on her body
and for that reaction to be sensed by another device, is strictly less
than the time needed for the Master to be informed about an action.
In the worst case, this is the time for 2 network message deliveries. The
worst case happens when a device sends a message to another device.
According to the DRnR synchronization protocol, to ensure ordering,
the receiving node needs to send a DRnR message to the Master. This
process needs to be completed before a physiological change happens
on the patient, sensed by another device and sent to the master.
• Recording Frequency. Lastly, DRnR assumes that the time elapsed
between two local recordings plus the time it takes for 1 network mes-
sage delivery, is strictly bigger than the time it requires for 2 network
deliveries. More formally, let r1 be a recording on machine A, r2 be
an immediately subsequent recording on machine A and L the time to
deliver a network message between two machines.
Then, DRnR’s projection protocol’s Recording Frequency assumption is:
2L < r2 − r1 + L (3.4)
Consequently DRnR assumes that network latencies are less than the time
elapsed between two local recordings:
L < r2 − r1 (3.5)
Note that the latter is a much looser assumption than the one needed by
NTP to guarantee the ordering. The Recording Frequency assumption is
important for DRnR to tackle the following case: consider a device that
sends a message to another device. The receiving node then sends a message
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to the master. If before the second message is received at the master, the
first device takes a local action and sends a message to the Master which
receives this message, then the second event would be incorrectly ordered
before the first event. When devices don’t communicate directly but only
through the patient, then the Recording Frequency is not needed. We
performed experiments to better understand how frequently local events are
recorded for medical applications (see Evaluation 4). This would help us
define the network latencies that DRnR can tolerate to guarantee the ordering
in practice.
Figure 3.3 depicts an example of DRnRs projection protocol. It is evident
from the figure that events can now be projected on a single timeline. In
particular at the end of an operation, DRnR performs a log merging. Dur-
ing that process, DRnR will assign to each event of a device, the equivalent
timestamp recorded by the Master due to the DRnR message that followed
such event. Thus all events will be ordered on the Master’s timeline.
Figure 3.3: DRnR timestamp projection example
3.4 Replay Scheduling
Whether projection or NTP is used during recording, at the end of the
medical operation, DRnR collects the local device logs to the Master replay
machine. There it performs a log merging operation to create a global or-
dering of events. DRnR uses this ordering along with a token mechanism to
enforce the partial ordering of events during the replay operation.
27
3.4.1 Log Merging
When the logs are collected from the individual devices, DRnR will parse
them to generate a token queue. The token queue will determine which
event (system call) will be replayed in which order. In the case of the projec-
tion ordering, the master will examine the vector timestamps at the Master
and the vector timestamps at the individual device logs to determine the or-
der of events. In the case of NTP use, the local times are trusted to delineate
the global time. In particular, every event will end up being associated with
a global start time and an end time.
During log merging, there are four cases and their symmetrical in terms
of event ordering as depicted in Figure 3.4. In case D, events at different
machines start and end at the same time. In case C, an event starts and
finishes on one machine before any event on another machine starts. However,
in Case B, when an event starts on machine 1 and before it finishes, an event
on another machine starts and finishes. Also in Case A, when an event starts
on machine 1 and before it finishes, an event on another machine starts. The
second event finishes after the event on machine 1 finishes. DRnR treats
case C as fully concurrent events and will allow machine 1 and machine 2 to
execute those system calls in parallel. Note that the execution need not be
concurrent as well. This is because there is no loss of causality during replay.
In Case C, DRnR will force deterministic execution of events. For example,
it will not allow machine 2 to start replaying before the execution on machine
1 finishes. In cases A and B it is much harder to guarantee that the replay
will follow the exact execution timing of the recording. Note that replaying
a system call, does not necessarily take the same time as during recording.
This is because Arnold caches the input for the system call which is fed
during replay. In those cases, DRnR guarantees that causal effects will be
captured in the following way. DRnR uses a causality threshold (tc) which
determines at system call granularity whether a system call on machine 1
could potentially influenced a system call on machine 2. In particular if the
difference between the start time of the system call on machine 1 and the
start time of the system call on machine 2 is less than tc, DRnR reduces case
A or B to case D. Otherwise, if the difference is equal or larger than tc this
means that a causal effect could have taken place and as such DRnR needs
to show that during replay. Thus, in the latter case, DRnR reduces A or B
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to C.
More formally, let ts,1 be the recorded start time of an event on machine
1, ts,2 be the recorded start time of an event on machine 2, ts,2 > ts,1 since
we are considering cases A and B, and tc is the causality threshold. DRnR
reduces case A or B to case D if ts,2 − ts,1 < tc and to case C otherwise.
Figure 3.4: Log Merging, the different cases DRnR considers
Setting tc is critical to ensure answering causality queries by doctors and
forensic analysts. To capture causality, tc needs to be greater or equal to
the least time it takes for an action by a device on a patient to cause a
physiological reaction to her body which will be sensed by a second device.
For example, there are guidelines for doctors and nurses that dictate such
reaction times per drug, which can be utilized by DRnR to automatically
determine tc. However, tc should also be greater or equal to the minimum
network latency observed in the system during recording. The latter is useful
to guarantee reflection of causality during replay when medical devices have
communicated directly with each other. If there is no such communication
the former condition is sufficient.
More formally, let tCPS be the time it takes for an action on a patient to
cause a physiological reaction. Let tc be the causality threshold and L be the
one-way network latency between two medical devices. Then tc must be:
tc ≤ min(tCPS)tc ≤ L (3.6)
The first condition is always necessary while the second is needed only
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when devices communicate with each other. However, in that case, since
tc ≤ L < min(tCPS) that means the second condition is enough for this case.
3.4.2 Log Merging Algorithm
Our log merging algorithm is illustrated in Algorithm 2. Initially it sets
a pointer to the first log line of every log. Then it compares the pointed
lines to figure out the order case (see Figure 3.4). In case D, the algorithm
stores sequentially all fully concurrent events that have started and ended
before the remaining pointed lines. Their pointers are increased to their next
individual log lines. In case C, the oldest event is listed and its line pointer is
increased. In the worst case, the algorithm will encounter only case C. That
means its time complexity would be linear with respect to the sum of all log
lines.
O(∑Ni=1mi) (3.7)
where mi = lines in log i, and N = number of logs. The space complexity
is always O(∑Ni=1mi) since we need to store one line per event.
3.4.3 Scheduling with Token Distribution
During replay, a master machine enforces orderly execution of events using a
token mechanism. Next, we describe DRnR’s token generation algorithm
and token scheduling.
3.4.4 Token Generation
The token generation procedure is illustrated in Figure 3.5. The log merging
output is traversed linearly and events are added in an FCFS (First Come
First Served) Token Queue (TQ). Whenever a case C entry is encountered,
a new token is added to the queue. However, when a series of case D events
are encountered, a queue node fills up with multiple sub-tokens. In our
prototype implementation, the sub-tokens are stored in a hashmap using the
device id as the key. Note that a series of fully concurrent case D events in
the log merging output could follow another series of fully concurrent events.
DRnR distinguishes between them by assigning a monotonically increasing
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integer shared between fully concurrent events. Case C events always have
unique such ids. The space complexity of the TQ is again O(∑Ni=1mi) since
we store one token (or sub-token) per line in the global log.
Figure 3.5: DRnR token generation
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Figure 3.6: DRnR token processing - stage 1 to 3
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Figure 3.7: DRnR token processing - stage 4 to 6
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Algorithm 2: Log Merging
Input: N recording logs
Output: A log with all distributed events ordered
1 ttemp ← 0;
2 GlobalEventList ← 0;
3 initLogPointers(pointers [N]);
4 while not at the end of all logs do
5 switch compareLogLines (pointers [N]) do
6 case A or B do
7 if ttemp < tc then
8 foreach line in pointers do
9 GlobalEventList ← line, D pointers [index of line]++
10 end
11 end
12 else
13 GlobalEventList ← oldestLogLine (pointers), C pointers [index of
oldestLogLine ]++
14 end
15 break;
16 end
17 case C do
18 GlobalEventList ← oldestLogLine (pointers), C pointers [index of oldestLogLine
]++ break;
19 end
20 case D do
21 foreach concurrent line in pointers do
22 GlobalEventList ← line, D pointers [index of line]++
23 end
24 break;
25 end
26 end
27 end
28 return GlobalEventList
3.4.5 Token Scheduling
During Replay, executors take on the task to replay the recording logs of
each medical device. There is a 1:1 relationship between medical devices and
executors. The Master node takes the role of the scheduler. In particular,
every executor is only allowed to execute a system call if it has been granted
the appropriate token. Figure 3.8 depicts the scheduling protocol.
An executor asks the Master scheduler for a token before it attempts to
execute a system call. If the request matches the first token in the queue,
the scheduler sends the token to the executor which proceeds with the replay
of that system call. At the same time, the scheduler moves the token (or
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sub-token in case D) from the TQ to an Active Token Queue (ATQ). As
long as the ATQ holds a token, no further tokens are being granted. This
ensures replay scheduling of case C (see Figure 3.4). Note that waiting for
the end of the previous system call before executing a system call of another
machine is important. Consider for example the case where we grant a token
to machine 1 and before it finishes execution we grant a token to machine 2.
Even though we granted the tokens in order, there is no guarantee that their
execution will follow the same order.
To delete a token (or sub-token) from the ATQ, the scheduler needs to
know the end time of a replay execution. A straightforward way to do this
is to have the executor send a message to the scheduler. Note however, that
when a system call is executed, the next action that an executor takes is
to replay the next system call. Thus it will need to send a message to the
scheduler requesting for a new token. DRnR executors only need to send
token request messages, since such a message, implies the finished execution
of the previous system call.
When the TQ has a node with sub-tokens first (case D), then requests from
multiple executors can be served concurrently. For example, if TQ’s first node
has a sub-token for Executor 1 and Executor 2, then the scheduler can grant a
token to both in whatever order the request is received. This does not violate
causality since sub-tokens represent events that are concurrent and as such
their order of replay can be arbitrary. Again, the sub-tokens are moved to
the ATQ once granted but they remain part of the same ATQ node. Any
sub-token not part of the original node or token cannot be granted unless
the ATQ node is fully emptied.
Figure 3.8: Distributed Replay with Token Scheduling
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3.4.6 Optimization: Token Batching
DRnR’s token scheduling can guarantee ordering for case C and case D.
However, there is a large amount of messages that the schedulers need to ex-
change with the executors. To make things worse, the executors need to wait
after every system call execution for a new token. Consider for example the
scenario where the TQ holds n tokens for machine 1 consecutively, followed
by m tokens for machine 2 also consecutively. In this case, the scheduler
needs to exchange 2n + 1 messages with machine 1 and 2m + 1 messages
with machine 2. Assuming delay d to deliver a message, machine spends
(2n + 1)× d time negotiating tokens.
DRnR alleviates this using batching: DRnR traverses the TQ queue and
merges consecutive tokens of case C destined for the same device. It further
adds an expiration number equal to the number of tokens concatenated. The
latter allows executors continuous use of the token until it expires. In the
previous example, this would result in machine 1 exchanging just 3 messages 1
and thus spending 3 × d time negotiating tokens. These are the “Token
Request”, “Token Granted” and the last “Token Request” indicating the
end of replay on that machine.
1Note that this is the best case for batching. In the worst case, batching has no effect.
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CHAPTER 4
EVALUATION
4.1 Implementation Performance
This section illustrates the performance of Arnold and DRnR. It’s worth to
mention that record and replay of a single machine has a lower overhead
compared to a distributed model. This is simply due to multiple factors such
as network latency, application correlation, and clock synchronization(in the
NTP scenario).
4.2 Performance of Arnold
Note: Section 4.2 is directly taken from [5]
We measured Arnolds performance overhead during recording (i.e., the
overhead that would normally be experienced by a user). All tests were run
on a computer running Ubuntu 12.04 LTS with an 8 core Xeon E5620 2.4
GHz processor, 6GB memory, and a 1 TB 7200RPM hard drive.We measured
several terminal and GUI applications, and one server workload (apache):
• kernel copy cp -a of the 3.5.0 Linux source.
• CVS checkout check out Arnolds kernel source (589 MB, 52730 files)
from a repository accessible via a local, 1 Gb local network connection.
• make compile the libelf-0.8.9 library.
• latex build a prior OSDI paper with latex/bibtex.
• apache run the apache benchmark on an apache 2.2.22 server, config-
ured with mpm prefork with 256 workers, and a client connected via a
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1 Gb local network connection (5000 requests for a 34KB page with 50
concurrent requests at a time.)
• gedit open a 15,000 line C file and find/replace on a commonly oc-
curring string.
• facebook load the White Houses public Facebook page in Firefox
version 23.0 (the completion time is measured by the onLoad event.)
• spreadsheet Open a 704KB csv spreadsheet in LibreOffice 3.5 and
convert it to an xml document.
Arnold’s overall performance impact is small: overhead is under 12% with a
single disk for all but two workloads. The CVS checkout has approximately
100% overhead with a single disk because it saves all checked out data twice:
once as nondeterministic network input and again when CVS writes the data
to the file system. Adding a second logging disk reduces the overhead for
CVS to 15%.
The higher overhead seen by kernel copy is caused by saving filemap entries.
This workload is disk-bound and creates many small files. For each file
created, Arnold must create a B-tree to record lineage datathis is effectively
a worst-case for saving filemap entries.A separate logging disk reduces the
overhead to 1.7%.
The Facebook tests contained some outliers due to external network and
servers. We eliminated gross outliers (500% or more above the median) from
our measurements (both for baseline and for Arnold); doing so did not help
Arnold disproportionately.
We also evaluate the scalability of Arnold on several Splash 2 benchmarks,
shown in figure 4.1. While scalability was not a focus of our work, Arnold has
low overhead for all these benchmarks up to 8 threads.We attribute this to
two factors. First, Arnold requires programs to be racefree, so it only has to
check and log inter-thread synchronization operations rather than all shared-
memory operations. Second, Arnolds model-based compression reduces the
instrumentation overhead per synchronization operation to only two atomic
instructions in the common case.
In summary, Arnold adds modest overheads of less than 12% with a single
disk on all but 2 workloads over a wide range of desktop and interactive
applications. Adding a second hard drive reduces the overhead to under 8%
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Figure 4.1: Arnolds scaling, normalized to unmodified Linux, on Splash2
benchmarks. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals [5]
on all but one workload. In practice, even on single hard drive configurations,
we noticed virtually no difference between our recorded applications and non-
recorded applications. In fact, we needed to add a utility to our shell interface
simply to determine whether recording was currently enabled or disabled.”
4.3 Use Case Performance
We have implemented DRnR on top of Arnold. For our performance exper-
iments, the DRnR clients and the DRnR master are individual machines.
The DRnR master runs the log merging, token generation and is responsible
for granting tokens to clients. The replay executors are also located on the
DRnR clients. The DRnR clients are configured to synchronize using local
NTP. Note that with this scenario our replay performance results include the
penalty of the network latency paid during the token protocol messages. In
reality, the executors will be placed on the same machine as the scheduler.
Thus the message latencies will be much less.
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4.3.1 Recording Event Intervals
We build a heart rate sensing device that periodically reads the heart rate of
a patient. The heart rate sensing device is composed of a commodity heart
rate sensor that we connect to an Arduino board, our Arduino software
application, and a machine running Arnold. The sensor periodically sends
the measured heart rate signals to the chip, and the chip transmits these
data to a USB port of the connected computer. We further wrote a program
on a DRnR recording machine that takes these data and prints it. This
benchmark is important to our project because we need to evaluate whether
it is practical to deploy DRnR on medical devices in an Emergency Room
setting. Additionally, the intervals between measurements of the heart rate
monitor show the maximum network latency we can tolerate with the CPS
and Recording Frequency assumptions mentioned in Section 3.3.
Figure 4.2 shows the intervals (in milliseconds) between two consecutive
system calls in the Hear Rate Sensing Program. Table 4.1 shows the average,
standard deviation (std), and minimum value for these intervals. These val-
ues give us an approximation of the maximum network delay we can tolerate
with the CPS and Recording Frequency assumptions when the projection
protocol is used for event ordering.
Figure 4.2: System Call Intervals for Heart Rate Sensing Sensor
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Table 4.1: Average, Std, and Minimum Value for System Call Intervals
Average(ms) Std(ms) Minimum(ms)
54730 434974 251
4.3.2 Recording Performance
In this set of experiments we measure the execution time of different programs
(heart rate sensor, ls, wget) on a system without any recording capabilities,
and on a system with Arnold recording. Note that the performance of DRnR
recording with NTP will add an additional cost to Arnold recording added by
the NTP synchronization protocol. For each of the benchmark programs, we
measure the duration of each command/program under three settings: run-
ning without recording, recording with Arnold, and replaying with Arnold.
We compare these results to measure the overhead of recording and replaying
with Arnold.
We repeat each experiment 10 times to measure the average and standard
deviation of the execution time. For the experiment with the heart rate sens-
ing device, the program measures patient heart rate several times within one
execution. We estimate the time for a single measurement with Equation 4.1.
tS is the time for a single measurement; tT is the total execution time of the
program; m is the number of measurements the program takes.
tS =
tT
m
(4.1)
Figure 4.3 illustrates the average time it takes for the heart rate system to
report a measurement when the recording is enabled (w) and when it is not
(w/o). We compare that with respective experiments on ls and wget. It is
evident that the heart rate system requires at least one order of magnitude
more time to take a measurement compared to a local and a networking
program to complete. This is because it depends on the human factor which
validates our CPS assumption.
4.3.3 Replay Performance
Figure 4.4 shows the average time (in millisecond) for the heart rate sys-
tem, ls command, and wget command to be replayed with Arnold system.
Comparing to the recording time, the replay time is much faster because the
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return values of the system calls have already been buffered in Arnold.
To evaluate the effect of DRnR replay overhead on top of Arnold, we
focus on the log merging operation. In particular, we measure the number of
tokens generated for the ls program run on two different machines. We first
record ls with a small time difference between the machines to interleave
their global times during log merging. We call this the common case. We
repeat the above starting the recording of the second ls program after the
first has been completed. We call this the deterministic case. This case
is useful to illustrate the maximum benefit of batching for ls. The initial
record log of ls contains 77 events and thus without batching DRnR will
generate 77 tokens. Figure 4.5 illustrates the effect of batching. Evidently
batching greatly reduces the number of tokens and thus the messages and
stop-and-wait times for executors during replay.
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Figure 4.3: Application Performance with recording (w) and without (w/o)
recording
Figure 4.4: Replay Performance
Figure 4.5: Number of tokens generated for 2 parallelly recorded ls
programs w/ and w/o batching
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CHAPTER 5
APPLICATIONS OF OUR APPROACH
5.1 Security in Emergency Room
We can categorized the security constrains of an emergency room as follows:
• Current security in an ER
• Future of security in an ER
Current Security in an ER: Current emergency rooms are lacking a cen-
tralized and specialized security system, it is a fact that most ER’s are falling
behind when security is considered. Recently for more than a week, hacker
have shut down the internal computer system at a Hollywood-area hospital
for ransom of 9,000 bitcoin, equal of $3.7 million, according to NBC 4 Los
Angeles.
According to Tim Erlin, director of IT security and risk strategy at en-
terprise cybersecurity firm Tripwire, ”It’s a good reminder that you don’t
have to attack the medical device to attack its ability to deliver care,the
IT infected was things like email, but the inability to access those systems
degrades the ability to deliver care.”
Nonetheless, security in hospitals is very similar to security practices in
other industry, having this not so specialized security procedures leaves most
hospitals vulnerable to different attacks, thus and best to our knowledge there
are not security mechanisms to identify, assist, and protect medical devices
vulnerabilities.
While we were looking for existing solutions, we recognized that hospi-
tals are more emphasizing their security practice revolving their staff, for
example, one company suggest the following options to secure the hospital
environment:
• Emergency notification systems
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• Biometrics
• Virtual fencing
what we see above is certainly against what a modern hospital is required
to have to provide a secure system to its patients, as an example none of
the provided solutions covers medical devices. Per FDA guidance passed on
June 2013, hospitals are required to ensure that medical devices are having
the following properties: intrusion detection and prevention assistance
and are not currently infected with malware [43, 44].
In short, we did not identify any specialized technologies in hospitals nor
in emergency rooms which are able to protect the patient or medical devices
from either internal or external cyber-attacks.
Future of security in an ER: Current emergency rooms are striving
to add more technology in order to handle the safety and vital signs of the
patient. Despite the good tendency of such approach, unfortunately the
security of such devices has not been the priority. What we have found during
our research indicates that there is a need for blackbox model in an emergency
room where every action will be recorded and later can be replayed. This
approach can be beneficial in different ways, for example understating what
exactly has happened internally with a device as well as monitoring the
actions of the medical staff while interacting with the patient. Additionally
understating the behavior of each medical device in correlation with other
devices in the room is crucial. We predict that the future of emergency room
includes full record and replay for the duration of each operating. This model
includes recording the user interaction and device-to-device interaction, what
is obvious here is the fact that the center of all activities is the patient, thus
collecting as much as information from and around the patient can provide
a better understating of what has taken place in an emergency room.
5.2 Educational Purposes of Record and Replay
Distributed Record and Replay can provide a platform to record and replay
certain operations in an Emergency Room where later such logs can be used
to train the new medical staff. Consider the following scenario: an IP is
45
connected to a patient where it’s programmed to infuse 10mg of Dopamine 1
every 30 minutes. While the pump is functioning a malfunction internally
forces the pump to shut down, or prevents the pump from infusing the drug
to the patient. Such scenario is not rare and happens frequently in an Emer-
gency Room. In order to train the new medical staff showcasing the exact
scenario while the pump is connected to a patient is not practical. Having
record and replay capabilities, on the other hand can provide a platform to
put the IP in the same situation as the incident took place, thus the medical
staff can get the same feeling of what the situation could be without putting
the patient’s life in danger. In the Distributed Record and Replay model,
in addition to the IP, we can record other medical devices present in the
room such as anesthesia machine and patient monitor. The advantage of
the distributed model is in regards to identifying the faulty medical equip-
ment where the equipment are directly communicating. As the result, being
able to show a parallel replay of every action from any medical device is an
essential task.
5.3 Distributed Record and Replay for Embedded
Devices
Distributed record and replay is not only limited to an Emergency Room
but also can be deployed in an environment such as factory floor. DRnR’s
audit capabilities for a group of devices can be helpful when products quality
and authenticity matters. In section 6 we discuss our attack on different
manufacturing equipment such as 3D printer and CNC mill using sensors on
smartphones, although in our test none of the devices were directly connected
to each other but they had interaction with one single product. Both types
of machinery were performing tasks on a product, thus indirectly they were
interacting.
Distributed record and replay can help the staff of manufacturing sector
to identify which machinery and at what stage was misinforming, therefore
identifying the point of failure. Additionally, record and replay can help
the product evolution by identifying the weakness in each equipment. This
factor is possible since distributed record and replay allows parallel replay
1Type of medication that improves the pumping strength of the heart and blood flow.
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of every machine in an environment regardless of their direct or indirect
communication.
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CHAPTER 6
SECURITY OF MANUFACTURING
FLOOR
6.1 Introduction
Hackers have taken notice of the increasing amounts of valuable information
available in the cyber-physical systems on manufacturing factory floors. In
addition to straightforward data theft, adversaries can potentially take ad-
vantage of simple yet effective side-channel attacks based on electromagnetic
leaks, acoustic emissions, timing information, light emission, and power con-
sumption [45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50]. The leaked information can be used to
compromise systems and to obtain or infer sensitive data. For example,
researchers have partially compromised Diffie-Hellman exponents, factored
RSA keys, and broken other cryptosystems by measuring the amount of time
required to perform private key operations [51, 52, 53]. Defending against
side-channel attacks requires a level of security more advanced and more com-
prehensive than updating an operating system or installing security patches.
Despite the efficacy of firewalls and anti-virus software, there is currently no
effective way for manufacturers to protect against information leakage from
their factory floor equipment.
Side-channels also exist in modern phones. Smartphones are programmable
and come with a growing number of cheap yet powerful embedded sensors,
including a microphone, accelerometer, magnetometer, gyroscope, GPS, and
camera. While most intended uses of smartphone sensors, such as fitness
tracking, are benign, they open up additional avenues for attack. A smart-
phone’s accelerometer, for example, can be used to infer a password typed
on its screen [54].
Figure 6.1 Describers the high level system and attack model. Designs
and raw materials are the inputs to a manufacturing process that produces
completed parts. By placing phone sensors near the manufacturing process
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Figure 6.1: The high level system and attack model
Figure 6.2: The attack setup
and analyzing the data they collect, the side-channel attack reconstructs the
design and the manufacturing process.
We present a novel attack that uses the sensors in a mobile phone to
capture sensitive information from manufacturing equipment on a factory
floor, as shown in Figure 6.1. In a typical factory, nearly everyone on the
factory floor has a phone or other electronic device that can be deliberately or
inadvertently used to execute a version of this attack. Thus the effectiveness
of the attack is independent of the level of information technology or security
sophistication on the factory floor and inside the manufacturing equipment.
As shown in Figure 6.2 For the phone attack, a phone is placed on the
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same table as a 3D printer (left) or mill (right) and records the readings of
its sensors. For the phone call attack, an attacker on the other end of a call
records the call’s audio.
We capture the relevant sensor data by deliberately or accidentally placing
an attack-enabled phone close to, on top of, or inside a piece of manufacturing
equipment, while the machinery is fabricating the target object. Figure 6.2
shows this setup. Alternatively, the relevant audio can be recorded by de-
liberately or accidentally making or receiving a phone call while standing
next to the machinery, or by having any other device nearby with a micro-
phone and appropriate malware. We provide methods that use the captured
data to reconstruct a model of the object being manufactured, along with
its manufacturing process parameters. We demonstrate the attack with both
additive and subtractive manufacturing, using a 3D printer and a CNC mill.
We demonstrate the reconstruction methods with a 3D printer and discuss
ways to reduce the attack’s effectiveness.
Contributions. We outline the research contributions below:
• New techniques. We show that the data captured by acoustic and mag-
netic sensors embedded in the phone can be used to identify specific
manufacturing equipment and manufacturing processes, including re-
constructing manufactured objects and reproducing the processes used
to make them.
• New understanding. We demonstrate the feasibility of applying side-
channel attacks to manufacturing equipment, in particular 3D printers
and CNC mills. The fundamentally different operating modes of these
two types of manufacturing equipment indicate that the attack may be
broadly applicable across many types of manufacturing equipment.
• Implementation and evaluation of reconstruction methods. We provide
two methods for reconstructing manufactured objects and the processes
used to make them, based on machine learning and on signal processing
plus crowdsourcing, respectively. We show that these methods accu-
rately reconstruct two previously unseen objects.
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6.1.1 Background
Traditional high-value discrete manufacturing relies heavily on subtractive
processes: equipment is used to cut, chip, and grind away excess material to
form the desired product. Interest is high in the potential for new additive
manufacturing processes, in which material is deposited layer by layer until
the desired object is formed. Our attack and reconstruction methods target
both additive and subtractive manufacturing, represented in our experiments
by a 3D printer and CNC mill, respectively.
Cyberattacks on the manufacturing sector typically fall into one of three
categories: theft of intellectual property or processes, disruption of man-
ufacturing operations, and sabotage of products or reputation [55]. These
cyberattacks are already widespread: in 2014, 21% of manufacturers reported
a loss of intellectual property (IP) [56]. These observed losses may be the tip
of the iceberg, as 69% of all 2012 data breaches were carried out within a few
hours, but 64% of breaches took months or years to detect [57]. Further, the
number of manufacturing cyberattacks is growing fast: the Industrial Con-
trol Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT), operated by
the US Department of Homeland Security, responded to 50% more incidents
in the manufacturing sector in 2015 than in 2014 [58, 59].
IP theft can target product design information, manufacturing process
information, or both. The advantage of stealing design information is clear;
less obvious to a computer scientist is the value of process information. But
in fact, many manufacturers’ competitive advantage lies in the fact that they
know how to manufacture a given design better, faster, or cheaper than
their competitors do. Process information may include the details of what
materials are used, what machines are used and in what order, plus all the
settings of those machines: which tool head was used, its rotation rate, the
material feed rate, and so forth.
One factor in the prevalence of IP theft is the rudimentary IT security
measures in place in many factories. One factor in the weak security is that
expensive manufacturing equipment can last for decades, and like a NASA
mission to outer space, its embedded computer systems will forever reflect
the state of the art at the time the equipment was purchased. But the largest
barrier to adoption of additional cyber-security defenses is that many man-
ufacturers, especially smaller businesses, are unwilling to compromise their
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productivity [60]: every minute of downtime means lost revenue, such as the
average $1.3M per hour loss for auto industry downtime [61]. Any software
or hardware change can produce an expensive domino effect that increases
downtime. For example, upgrading the operating system may require new
hardware, which requires new software and drivers; any equipment that isn’t
compatible with the upgrade must be replaced; the new systems must be
tested extensively, as some applications may behave differently; and the users
must be trained on the new systems [62]. Though methods to improve IT
security while respecting the need for continuous operation are an interesting
direction for future research, our attack is not affected by the quality of the
security measures in a factory’s IT systems.
The manufacturing sector has a rich history of research on obtaining infor-
mation about a manufacturing process from its acoustic emissions. Record-
ings have been used to judge parameters including tool wear, tool breakage,
chatter, chip formation mechanism, material removal regime, sheet metal
material hardness, sheet metal thickness, and the identity of the metal or
alloy being machined [63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69]. Our reconstruction methods
use acoustic information for less benign purposes.
Figure 6.3: Raw sensor data from the three axes of the accelerometer and
magnetometer while 3D-printing a square
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Figures 6.3 and 6.8 show example accelerometer, magnetometer, and au-
dio data from a modern phone. The many sensors in Android phones and
iPhones include an audio sensor (microphone), image sensor (camera), touch
sensor (screen), acceleration sensor (tri-axial accelerometer), light sensor,
proximity sensor, and several sensors (including the Global Positioning Sys-
tem) for establishing location [70]. Currently, most phone sensors are used to
collect data from the surroundings of the user to offer external observations
to a specific application. For example, Metal Sniffer: Metal Detector is
a portable metal detector app available on the Google Play store that takes
advantage of the magnetometer sensor in an Android device to identify elec-
tromagnetic fields which ultimately assist the user in locating nearby metal
and magnets [71]. Another example is the Accelerometer Monitor app,
which according to the publisher, “saves vibration data into SD card” [72].
Such data has already been used for malicious purposes [73, 74, 75, 76]. for
example, Cai et al. [77] highlight the capabilities of modern mobile devices
for snooping on users by sniffing their smartphone’s sensors, such as the
microphone, camera, and GPS sensor.
Al Faruque et al. [78] recognized that thermal side channels can be used
to infer activities taking place inside a 3D printer. Closer to our work, they
investigated the possibility of attacking manufacturing machinery via audio
recordings [79]. They placed a microphone close to additive manufacturing
equipment to record fabrication runs, then used machine learning to recon-
struct the low-level instructions (G-code) used to manufacture the object,
with an accuracy of 89.72% in reproducing the as-designed object’s perime-
ter. While Al Faruque et al. used a high-quality microphone located in a
specific location in a controlled environment, our work uses ordinary mo-
bile phones that may be located anywhere near the machine or in the user’s
hand, with machinery located in public fabrication labs. We employ different
reconstruction methods from Al Faruque et al., and our experiments show
that we reconstruct perimeters more accurately; however, we also suggest
different measures of accuracy that we believe to be more revealing. A final
difference is that because G-code is quite low level, reproducing the same ob-
ject on a different model or type of machine requires nontrivial extra work to
rewrite the G-code. For that reason, we provide a higher-level reconstruction
suitable for translation into G-code for a variety of machines.
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Figure 6.4: Example spectrograms for audio data: juxtaposed frequency
magnitude spectrograms of 360 different angles of machine head travel with
a 3D printer (top) and CNC mill (bottom). This data is used in a reference
library for the crowdsourced reconstruction method
6.2 Attacker Motivations & Access
When Eve’s phone illicitly records data about the factory floor, she could be
intentionally carrying out corporate espionage. Alternatively, she could be
an unwitting dupe with a compromised application, or the innocent maker
or receiver of a phone call at an ill-advised moment. In these latter cases,
Eve may have been targeted by a third party such as a rival manufacturer, or
swept up in a large net cast by a well-financed backer of economic espionage
such as a nation-state.
A third-party backer’s decision to finance the attack or purchase the infor-
mation thus obtained may be driven by the cost or impossibility of developing
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an equivalent design or process for local use, or by a desire for greater sit-
uational awareness. For example, a nation-state hacker might be seeking to
increase the competitiveness of its manufacturing sector or to gain the ability
to manufacture objects viewed as important for the national interest. Such
motivations may have been behind the theft of the design for Lockheed Mar-
tin’s US F-35 Lightning II fighter jet, stolen by hackers allegedly supported
by the Chinese government1. The US and Israeli governments allegedly un-
leashed STUXNET, which targeted the programmable logic controllers of
Iran’s nuclear centrifuges, causing them to self-destruct. Allegedly, the Chi-
nese government financed the large-scale theft of industrial IP [80], and the
Iranian government sponsored IT intrusions overseas [81]. The US or Is-
raeli governments have been attributed as the source of the Flame malware,
apparently designed to increase situational awareness of Iran’s technical ca-
pabilities and activities [82]. In addition to gathering files likely to contain
technical information, Flame collected data from the sensors of the devices
it infected.
While Flame targeted Windows PCs, similar malware can be constructed
for phone applications. Wikipedia (accessed on 22 May 2016) provides ex-
amples, three of which we discuss here. First, the Shedun Android malware
provides a framework for automatically downloading and installing unde-
sired new applications and for serving potentially malicious adware; Shedun
is considered “next to impossible to remove entirely” by security researchers.
DroidKungFu offers similar capabilities for automatic installation of mali-
cious new apps, and is targeted at users in China. With over a thousand new
infections per day as of this writing, malware like Shedun and DroidKungFu
provides a channel to reach factory employees like Eve. The malware may
even be present when a phone is first purchased, as Indian phone manufac-
turer Gionee was accused of doing2. Once a malicious app has been installed,
its recording function could be activated by a geofence around the factory,
while running in the background of another app with appropriate permis-
sions, such as a game.
These considerations affect the practicality of phone-based attacks. If na-
1“Chinese hackers stole F-35 fighter jet blueprints in Pentagon hack, Edward Snowden
documents claim”: http://goo.gl/Vnvbs2.
2“Wenn der Spion in der Hosentasche steckt” (If the Spy Is in Your Pants Pocket), Die
Welt, 12 October 2014.
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tional interests are at stake, state sponsored hackers can have very deep
pockets for casting a wide net and carrying out the kinds of technical work
and social engineering necessary to get a compromised application onto a fac-
tory employee’s phone. The compromised application needs only to record
the data from key sensors and oﬄoad it to the sponsoring organization at
a convenient future moment. Similarly, deep pockets can make it easy to
arrange a call to an unsuspecting employee on the factory floor and record
the audio, e.g., while the employee is on hold for a supposed pizza delivery
or sweepstakes prize. These attacks are effective even if the factory floor’s
own cyber-physical systems are invulnerable.
6.3 Reconstruction Methods
With sensor data in hand, the next step is to reconstruct the object being
manufactured and the process used to make it. The crowdsourced recon-
struction method, presented in Section 6.3.1, uses basic signal processing
techniques and can be guided by a non-expert user if reconstruction is diffi-
cult. Its current implementation uses audio data only, making it compatible
with both the phone-call and malicious-application attacks. The machine
learning reconstruction method, in Section 6.3.2, uses machine learning tech-
niques to reconstruct a fabricated object from magnetometer and microphone
sensor data.
Different fabrication machines have different process parameters. For ex-
ample, a grinding wheel can run at different speeds. The wheel could be
touching the object being made, or could be away from it, e.g., while repo-
sitioning the wheel to a different location on the object. The object could
be moving past the wheel at different rates of speed. The same machine
could use grinding wheels with different levels of grit. As no single paper can
reconstruct all process parameters for all major types of equipment, we had
to choose the key parameters to focus on here.
In making this decision, we were guided by previous research in the manu-
facturing community that, as mentioned earlier, concluded that many aspects
of fabrication have inherent acoustic signatures. (We reconfirm certain as-
pects of these findings in Section 6.4.) With this understanding in place, we
focused our reconstruction efforts on two key process parameters for many
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types of machines, related to where the tool head is located with respect to
the object being fabricated. This location parameter is important for both
additive and subtractive manufacturing, and must be specified in order to
control machines as disparate as a 3D printer and a CNC mill. Further,
acoustic signatures that specify this location parameter have not been estab-
lished in previous work. In the discussion that follows, we describe tool head
location with respect to the bed of a machine, which defines an implicit XY
plane.
Different machines have different constraints in traversing 3D space, and
reconstruction can take advantage of these constraints to simplify the task.
For example, a 3D printer builds up an object in horizontal layers, one by
one. At any given layer, the printer head moves in an XY plane, and can
trace any angle in that plane with respect to the X axis. The printer slowly
works its way up the Z axis, with a characteristic sound as it repositions
itself higher up. Further, in an object with multiple layers, each layer must
either overlap the previous layer or have its own support material, so a layer’s
shape is constrained by the previous layer. Likewise, a subtractive manufac-
turing operation can only remove material adjacent to material it has already
removed, and subtractive methods typically also work in layers. We take ad-
vantage of this layer-focused machine behavior by restricting our attention to
the XY plane for a fixed value of Z, i.e., a given layer. Further, our training
data and validation experiments use almost-planar objects (two layers thick,
in the case of the 3D printer; and relatively thin metal, in the case of the
mill).
We describe tool head movement in terms of the head’s angle of movement
with respect to the X axis plus the distance moved along that straight line.
Any planar figure that can be manufactured by machines like a CNC mill and
a 3D printer can be specified as a sequence of movements to be made at par-
ticular angles for particular distances (with curves being described by short
tangential segments). We reconstruct both the angles and the distances.
6.3.1 Crowdsourced Reconstruction
The crowdsourced reconstruction method relies on a reference library con-
structed in advance, using one example audioclip for each angle that the
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Figure 6.5: In-progress reconstruction of a 3D-printed star via the
crowdsourcing method, with spectrogram above and match filter beneath
machine tool head might traverse. Before saving an audioclip in the library
(or applying reconstruction to an audioclip), we use several standard au-
dio signal analysis techniques to improve the quality of its signal. First,
the audioclip is divided into frames, and we use a Hanning window method
with an overlap of 25% between successive audio frames; this is the default
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Figure 6.6: Frequency magnitude spectrograms of the sound of a 3D printer
making the same three geometric primitive objects, a square, circle, and
triangle, at three different feed rates (15, 22.5, and 30 mm/sec). The
increase in head travel speed changes the spectrogram in a systematic way.
sliding window technique used in audio analysis to give cleaner frequency
estimates for signals and to reduce spectral leakage. Second, we convert the
audioclip to a spectrogram that shows the magnitude of each frequency over
time, using a short time Fourier transform (the default spectrogram function
in the computing environment we used). Third, we define the background
noise of the machine as the data in an audioclip from when the machine
was running but not fabricating, and apply standard audio background noise
normalization techniques to clarify the signal during fabrication. Fourth, we
remove frequency information outside the important band for that particular
machine, as determined by a cursory visual inspection of its spectrograms.
Fifth, for each frequency in a library audioclip, we average its magnitude
across all frames in the audioclip, and retain only the average value for each
of its frequencies. After this processing has been done for an example angle
audioclip, we save the results in the library. We also record any domain
constraints specific to that machine, such as inherent limits on the path that
its tool head can follow during fabrication.
With the simple signal processing techniques we used, the audio of each
angle a appears very similar to that of three other angles, created by mir-
roring the given angle in each quadrant of the plane (± a, 180 ± a); this
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introduces ambiguity into reconstruction. We suspect that more sophisti-
cated signal processing techniques that can pick out the secondary tones
visible in our spectrograms (and audible to a keen ear) can be used to tell
these angles apart, but that remains for future work, and we rely on simpler
coping methods described below.
With the reference library in hand and a target object to reconstruct from
its fabrication audio, we compute the normalized cross correlation between
each frame of target audio and each library angle. This produces one value for
each combination of a target audio frame and a library angle. For each target
audio frame, we select the library angle that maximizes the cross correlation
value. Then we compute a match filter that shows the chosen library angle
for each frame in the audio, from the first frame to the last. We also produce
a spectrogram corresponding to the target audio, and present the spectro-
gram and the match filter to the user, as shown in Figure 6.5’s screenshot
of our interactive reconstruction framework. Then the crowdsourced phase
begins, with a human evaluating and guiding the reconstruction work of the
framework. To prepare for this role, a user requires brief training in how to
recognize changes of angles and start/stop of tool work in audio frequency
spectrograms.
In our current framework implementation, the user has two tasks. First is
to identify the points in the audio at which the tool head changed its angle;
these points can be seen quite easily in a spectrogram. The identified points
divide the manufactured object into a series of straight-line tool head runs,
which we call segments. (We expect that segmentation can be automated
in the future, using signal processing techniques, so that the user’s task is
confined to catching irregularities caused by background sounds.) The user’s
second task is to look at the match filter for each segment, and click on the
most common match head height(s) among the frames for that segment. The
framework can automatically select the most common match head height in
a segment, but interaction allows the user to guide the search when she is
not satisfied with any of the framework’s automatically-generated objects, as
explained below.
Because of ambiguity, each match head clicked on by the user may corre-
spond to several different potential angles in the reference library. Thus in
our experiments, a k-sided manufactured object has a reconstruction search
space of size 4k, and the framework automatically explores this space. For-
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tunately, manufacturing domain constraints allow us to prune away almost
all of the search space. The constraints we used for the 3D printer are that
each object layer should form one or more 2-layer closed figures in the plane,
surrounded by a 1-layer bounding box; each segment in a closed figure should
intersect exactly two other segments, one at each of its endpoints; and at the
end of a segment, the printer head should change its angle of travel, rather
than continuing in a straight line or (unless it is the end of a layer) double
back on itself. Reconstructions that pass this test are shown to the user, who
can accept or reject them. If unhappy with all the reconstructions shown, the
user can click on additional match heads for a segment, so that additional
angles will be considered.
To construct a reference library, one needs access to audio recordings of
a machine model similar to the one used to build the target figures to be
reconstructed. This could be a machine owned by the attacker, to be used
for fabricating stolen designs or processes. Alternatively, as discussed in
Section 6.4, the needed calibration pattern could be hidden in the design of
an object fabricated on a machine belonging to the victim or a third party,
and recorded in an attack launched specifically to gather that information
for the library.
We found that the sound associated with travel at a particular angle to
the X axis did not depend on where the tool head was located on the Y axis,
so the example audio could be recorded with the tool head anywhere on the
machine bed. We found that angles that are just a few degrees apart have
very different audio signatures, so the recordings need to include sufficiently
many different angles to reconstruct the target figures accurately. Ideally,
the recordings should be made with the same machine settings as used when
making the target object; as pointed out earlier, different settings tend to
have different characteristic audio signatures.
For example, we found that increasing the feed rate of our 3D printer
shifts the key frequencies of the resulting audio in a systematic manner, as
shown in Figure 6.6. While to the human eye the pattern in the figure’s
three spectrograms is essentially the same (though compressed in time), the
shifted frequency magnitudes look quite different to the simple signal pro-
cessing techniques we used. We expect that there is a systematic relation-
ship between different settings that can be expressed mathematically, but
that remains for future work. Our current implementation assumes that pre-
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Figure 6.7: An overview of the machine learning approach.The processes
starts with training a model and ends with a high accuracy reconstructed
object model.
processing has already identified the signature of the machine model being
used and the feed rate, so that an angle reference library specific to those
parameters can be consulted during reconstruction.
6.3.2 Machine Learning Reconstruction
Figure 6.7 summarizes the machine learning reconstruction method. In the
first phase of the method, we build a model based on audio and magnetometer
training data from fabrication runs. In the second phase, we use the model to
reconstruct an object from its audio and magnetometer data recorded during
fabrication. After reconstruction, we use domain constraints to fine-tune the
reconstructed object. Both the training and reconstruction phases begin with
manual segmentation, as explained below. Unlike the crowdsourced method,
we do not apply noise reduction or other signal processing techniques to the
input data for training or reconstruction.
We experimented with a variety of machine learning methods for training:
linear and logistic regression, support vector machines, decision trees, and
neural networks. Logistic regression performed at least as well as the other
techniques, so we adopt it here. We train a model for the magnetometer
data that indicates which quadrant the angle corresponding to the machine
tool head’s direction of travel lies in, for a given segment. We train a sep-
arate regression model for the audio data that indicates the exact angle of
travel within that quadrant. We found that the addition of a third model
based on the accelerometer data did not further improve the accuracy of
reconstruction, so we use only audio and magnetometer data here.
In the remainder of the section, we discuss segmentation, training, and
reconstruction in more detail.
Segmentation. As in the crowdsourced method, we manually label the
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sensor input data to indicate the times at which the machine tool head
changes direction, i.e., each segment. If the data is to be used for train-
ing, we also manually label each segment to indicate the angle of travel of
the machine tool head during that segment. We split the data files into pieces
corresponding to individual segments, each to be considered separately dur-
ing training or reconstruction. The magnetometer data is not recorded at
even time intervals, but rather is polled when the values change, so we in-
terpolate the data to be spread evenly at a sampling rate of 100. Finally, we
perform a real fast Fourier transform on each individual segment, and pass
the results to the next step.
Training. After the segmentation step, we use the magnetometer training
data to build a logistic regression model. Given the magnetometer data cor-
responding to any possible segment, the model predicts which quadrant the
head is moving in with respect to the beginning point of that segment. This
approach is different from the crowdsourced method’s current implementa-
tion, which does not use magnetometer data, relying instead on a search
process and domain constraints to determine the correct quadrant for a seg-
ment’s angle.
Similarly, we fit a logistic regression model to the audio training data.
Given the audio for any possible segment, the model predicts which an-
gle within a quadrant the head is moving in when traversing that segment.
This differs from the crowdsourcing approach, which uses signal processing
techniques (normalized cross correlation) to compute the most likely angle
corresponding to each individual audio frame, and then suggests that the
angle chosen for the majority of frames in a segment is the most likely angle
for that segment.
Our models are configured slightly differently for the magnetometer and
sound models. Both models have the inverse of the regularization strength
set at small values to increase regularization and thus reduce overfitting. Our
magnetometer model only trains with four different labels for each quadrant,
so a ‘one vs all’ approach is appropriate, leading us to choose between a
stochastic average gradient descent solver and a coordinate descent algo-
rithm. There is a great deal of magnetometer data, so we use a stochastic
average gradient descent solver to optimize the speed of training.
Meanwhile, we use the sound data to detect angles, and we want the angle
chosen to be close as possible to the actual angle if chosen correctly; i.e.,
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we should choose 89 instead of 23 when the actual angle is 90. Therefore,
a ‘one vs all’ approach is inappropriate, and we need to capture the entire
probability spectrum. This led us to choose the BFGS algorithm for con-
structing the audio logistic regression model, with the loss minimized set as
the multinomial loss fit across the probability spectrum.
Reconstruction. Given segmented sensor data from a fabrication run,
the reconstruction step reconstructs the shape manufactured, including seg-
ment lengths and angles. More precisely, for each segment, the logistic re-
gression models produced in the training step predict the quadrant and angle
within that quadrant from the magnetometer and audio data, respectively.
As with the crowdsourced method, the duration of each segment times the
machine’s feed rate gives the physical length of each linear segment in the
reconstructed shape.
Domain constraints. We use several domain constraints to judge the
quality of a reconstructed object; if an object does not pass these tests, the
object is modified to satisfy the constraints. The first constraint is that the
reconstructed object be a closed figure, within a given threshold of toler-
ance (set to 0 in our experiments). If this constraint is met, we output the
reconstructed object; otherwise we move on to the next constraint.
The second constraint is that the object be symmetrical. In other words,
the shape produced during the first half of the duration of the fabrication run
should be a mirror image of the shape produced in the second half, within a
certain threshold (set to 0 in our experiments). If the symmetry constraint
is not met, we refine the candidate shape by replacing the values of each pair
of corresponding angles in the two halves by their average. Then we test the
closed-figure constraint again; if it is not yet satisfied, we replace the lengths
of each pair of corresponding segments by their average. We iterate with
these constraints until the closed-figure constraint is satisfied.
6.4 Experimental Results
Setup. We conducted the experiments on the Lulzbot Taz 5 3D printer
and Other Machine Co. Othermill CNC mill shown in Figure 6.2, hereafter
referred to as the “printer” and the “mill.” The X axis of each machine is
controlled by a stationary stepper motor that drives a carriage on which the
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tooling (the printer’s extruder and the mill’s spindle) rides. The Y axis of
each machine is controlled by a second stationary stepper motor that moves
the platform. The printer’s Z axis is controlled by two stepper motors, one on
each end, that raise and lower the full X axis. The mill’s Z axis is controlled
by a single stepper motor that controls the height of the spindle relative to
the X carriage, which remains fixed in height.
We built an Android app that monitors and records the sensor data on
a phone, and used it to record the audio and magnetometer data used in
reconstruction. The audio is collected at a 44100 sampling rate.
Figure 6.8: A comparison of the audio from the 3D printer recorded locally
(lower left), the CNC mill recorded locally (lower center), and the CNC mill
recorded on the other end of a phone call (right)
Figure 6.9: The signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of the accelerometer Y axis and
magnetometer Z axis readings on different devices
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6.4.1 Data Quality with Different Devices
To evaluate the quality of the sensor data produced by different devices,
we installed the recording app on seven smartphones and one tablet, listed
in Table 6.1. To ensure a fair comparison across devices, we placed each
device with its lower right corner 2.5 centimeters from the rear left corner of
the printer. Then we enabled the app’s recording function while the printer
fabricated a simple geometric shape resembling a trapezoid. The printed
object and its process parameters were identical in each trial.
We compared the signal to noise ratio (SNR) of the accelerometer and
magnetometer in each device. The Samsung Galaxy S6 performed the best
overall, with the highest accelerometer SNR and second-highest magnetome-
ter SNR. Surprisingly, the Nexus 6P, the newest model, had the second-lowest
accelerometer SNR. The full results are shown in Figure 6.9. The placement
of the sensors inside each device varies. While our other experiments sug-
gest that this variation will have a negligible impact on the reconstruction
quality compared to the variation inherent in the sensor’s quality for the
accelerometer, the magnetometer works at a much shorter range, and it may
be affected.
In evaluating the other sensors’ data quality, we focused on the Galaxy S6.
Manufacturer Model OS Form
HTC One M8 Android 6.0 Phone
Huawei Nexus 6P Android 6.0 Phone
LG G4 Android 5.1 Phone
LG Nexus 5 Android 5.1 Phone
OnePlus X Android 5.1 Phone
Samsung Galaxy S6 Android 5.1 Phone
Lenovo K30-T Android 4.4 Phone
Nvidia Shield Android 5.1 Tablet
Table 6.1: Compared Devices
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Figure 6.10: We tested the quality of the sensor recordings at different
distances from the printer. Starting from the rear left corner,
approximately midway between the X and Y motors, the phone was moved
away at a 45◦ angle.
Figure 6.11: The signal power of a phone’s sensor recordings at different
locations from the machine
6.4.2 Data Quality at Different Locations
To determine the impact of distance on data quality, we compared read-
ings from the Samsung Galaxy S6 at different locations relative to the 3D
printer. Beginning at the rear left corner, the phone was used to record the
same fabrication activity (a simple 45-degree line) as its distance from the
printer was incremented by 2.5 cm. We moved the phone away from the
printer in a line approximately 135 degrees from horizontal, so that it re-
mained approximately equidistant from the X and Y motors, as illustrated
in Figure 6.10.
We calculated the signal power of the accelerometer and magnetometer
readings at each location as a measurement of the effect of distance, as shown
in Figure 6.11. The accelerometer, which was measuring the movement of
the table the printer was placed on, had strong readings at all distances from
0 to 18 inches. The readings decreased slightly with distance, but the output
was clear and usable at all distances. In contrast, the magnetometer was
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measuring a magnetic field, and the strength of a magnetic field drops with
the distance cubed. The magnetometer readings were unusable at distances
greater than 4 inches. This limitation affects the machine learning method,
which uses the magnetometer to determine the quadrant of a segment’s angle
of travel.
6.4.3 Data from Different Machines
While the data generated by the 3D printer and mill is similar enough that
our reconstruction methods can be applied to both, the data is also distinct.
More generally, each machine has a unique signature, and types of machines
will have distinct sounds corresponding to their manufacturing processes.
For example, the sound of a mill’s spindle spinning and tool cutting is absent
in audio from a 3D printer. The spindle noise alone is sufficient to distin-
guish between the printer and the mill used in our experiments. Additionally,
the motors of each machine have a signature. Though they are nominally
identical, depending on the configuration of the machine, each motor moves
a different amount of weight. This distinction is already apparent within
our printer or mill: its X and Y motors are nominally identical but display
distinct signatures. The frequencies at which the motors emit noise, as a
function of the work they are doing, allows us to differentiate between dif-
ferent machine models. While this technique would also work to distinguish
between different models of the same machine type—say, two printers in-
stead of a printer and a mill—a more complex technique would be needed to
distinguish between two same-model machines.
To substantiate these claims, we compared recordings of the 3D printer
with recordings from the mill. The mill’s and printer’s X and Y movements
are driven by similar motors in similar configurations, and we found that the
mill’s movements exhibit a clear, consistent, and uniquely identifiable audio
signature, analogous to that of the 3D printer. We demonstrate this signature
in Figure 6.8, comparing the spectrograms of the same turbine blade shape
made on the printer and on the mill. The trace is shifted in frequency on the
two machines, since each motor on each machine has its own signature, but
the two traces exhibit the same pattern.
This suggests that a recording of a simple calibration pattern is all that
68
is needed to train either of our reconstruction methods on most 3D printers
and desktop mills, as well as other types of subtractive manufacturing meth-
ods operated by stepper motors. This calibration pattern could be hidden in
the interior of an object and designed to look like typical 3D printer infill,
or hidden in the toolpath of a subtractive manufacturing operation. If the
attacker asks the operator to manufacture this object and makes a record-
ing, she now has all the information necessary to reconstruct objects and
machining conditions from that machine.
6.4.4 Data Quality in a Phone Call Attack
The previous sections focused on the case where phone sensor data was cap-
tured by a malicious phone application. If the data was instead captured
during a phone call, the audio signal will have been altered by the phone’s
noise reduction. Conveniently, the key audio frequencies of factory floor ma-
chinery tend to lie in the same range as the human voice, so that the phone’s
noise reduction does not simply remove the signal.
We tested the phone call attack on both the printer and mill. The results
from each recording, while noisier, are clear and consistent with the audio
recorded directly on a phone located near the machine. For example, the
frequency magnitude spectrogram in Figure 6.8 shows that the same pattern
is visible whether a recording is made next to the mill or recorded through a
phone call. We also tested the phone call attack while people were speaking.
Figure 6.8 shows the difference in the audio when a person is speaking two
feet from the device next to the machine and speaking directly into the
microphone of the device far from the machine; even though the speech
overlaps the information-rich regions of the spectrogram, the trace is not
obscured completely and the shape is still clearly visible.
While reconstruction following a phone call attack must rely on audio
only, it greatly broadens the scope of the attack. Capturing information
from multiple sensors at once requires an appropriate app to be present on
the phone; in contrast, the phone call attack allows any phone, regardless of
intelligence, to capture factory audio with no prior preparation beyond being
prepared to record the call on the remote end. More generally, an audio-only
attack can be executed using any device with a microphone, which expands
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Figure 6.12: Results from the two reconstruction approaches.The original
design model (far left); the CAD design (left center); the printed form
(center left); the model reconstructed by the machine learning approach
before (center right) and after (right center) application of domain
constraints; and the model reconstructed by the crowdsourcing approach
(far right).
the attack to not only phones but also tablets, laptops, and other computers,
either through malware or by recording a voice-over-IP call.
6.4.5 Accuracy of Reconstruction
All training and test data for the reconstruction methods was recorded using
a Samsung Galaxy S6 placed within 4 inches of the printer, i.e., close enough
to collect high-quality magnetometer data. We did not try to place the phone
in the exact same position for each run. All of the training and test data for
reconstruction was collected with a printer feed rate of 30 mm/sec.
We implemented the machine learning approach using Python and the
sklearn and scipy libraries. For training data, we recorded a single run of the
3D printer traversing a 2-layer planar fan shape, shown in Figure 6.13, that
has 360 different angles of machine head travel in each mirrored half.
We built the crowdsourcing interactive framework using Matlab, Adobe
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Figure 6.13: The fan shape fabricated to provide example audio for
constructing the crowdsourcing reference library
Audition, and Python. For both the printer and the mill, we constructed a
crowdsourcing reference library from the audio of one pass of the machine
head over the left-hand half of the fan in Figure 6.13; a spectrogram of
the resulting library is shown in Figure 6.4. As mentioned earlier, to speed
up the reconstruction search process, we included several constraints in the
interactive framework: the reconstructed object should be within .5 feed
units of being a closed planar object with no mid-segment self-crossings, and
there should be a change of angle at the end of each segment.
We did not use a crowdsourcing service in our experiments, as that would
have required IRB approval, a lengthy process. Instead our ‘crowdsourced’
user was a colleague with no prior experience with 3D printers or mills, and
no prior experience in audio analysis. She prepared for her tasks by watching
and listening to videos of a 3D printer and mill traversing a square, circle,
triangle, and turbine blade outline (see the supplementary online material
mentioned earlier). From examining the resulting spectrograms, she learned
to recognize the visual signatures in the spectrogram corresponding to the
start and stop of the machine’s work on an object, the points where the
machine head changed its direction of travel, and tool head up/down. She
practiced by using the framework to reconstruct the triangle and square made
by the 3D printer and the mill; due to angle ambiguities, her results included
the actual objects as well as their mirror reflections. She was then asked to
reconstruct unknown objects.
We tested the machine learning and crowdsourced reconstruction methods
on a 3D-printed outline of a star and an airplane, namely, a B2 stealth
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bomber. These objects were not used in training the machine learning
method, and the crowdsourcing user had never seen either design before.
The resulting reconstructions, along with the original design, are shown in
Figures 6.12 and 6.14, and we discuss their accuracy below.
Our crowdsourced user reconstructed both the star and the airplane, plus
their mirror reflections. However, she described the airplane as a “fish
mouth” and was quite dissatisfied with the result, even revisiting the match
filter diagram to consider second-choice values for angles. In other words,
our human worker successfully reconstructed a mystery object, even though
the mystery object was not something she could recognize in real life.
We measure the quality of a reconstruction by computing the error in the
length of each side and degree of each angle in the crowdsourced reconstruc-
tion and the machine learning reconstruction with and without domain con-
straints, compared to the object’s original design. The crowdsourced method
reconstructed all angles correctly for the 3D printed plane; for the star, 8 of
the 10 angles were off by 1 degree and 2 were off by 2 degrees. For the 3D
printed star, 1 angle was off by 1 degree and the others were correct. The
machine learning method was 1.2 degrees off on average in reconstructing
the plane. For the mill, the crowdsourced method correctly reconstructed
all angles in a square; for a triangle, it reconstructed one angle exactly and
the other two with 1 degree of error. The machine learning reconstruction
reproduced 9 of the plane’s angles correctly, and the other two were off by 1
degree.
As both methods now perform segmentation manually, error in computing
segment lengths is independent of the segment lengths and reflects human
judgment. The crowdsourced user was off by approximately 1mm on aver-
age in indicating segment lengths for the plane and the star. We anticipate
that this error can be reduced in the future with automated assistance, as
the human’s focus with the interactive framework is on angle reconstruction,
rather than precise delimitation of segments. Both methods were highly
accurate in perimeter reconstruction, the measure used by [79], though as
noted above, this measure is quite sensitive to the segment lengths of the
target object. The machine learning method achieved 94.69% accuracy in
reconstructing the perimeter of the printed plane, and one iteration of the
domain constraints improved accuracy by 0.42% on average. The crowd-
sourcing method achieved 94.99% accuracy in perimeter reconstruction for
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the plane; the similar accuracy of both methods is to be expected, as it
indicates how carefully a human is manually segmenting the figure.
6.4.6 Discussion and Comparison
We designed, implemented, and tested our two reconstruction methods in
parallel, without cross-fertilization, starting from two opposite poles: fully
automated machine learning versus pure crowdsourcing that would take ad-
vantage of the human visual system. After testing, evaluation, evolution,
and comparison of results, it is clear how to combine the strengths of each
approach.
First, both methods’ implementations currently rely on a non-expert user
for segmentation, so their applicability is limited by the bandwidth of the
user. This burden can be reduced by using more sophisticated signal process-
ing techniques to recognize the clear audio signature of an angle change and
tentatively mark the beginning and end of each segment in the data. This
would be particularly useful when reconstructing objects with many short
segments, such as a circle.
Second, we incorporated simple standard audio signal processing tech-
niques into the crowdsourced method to improve data quality. These tech-
niques can be just as useful in improving the quality of the signal in input
data for the machine learning method, and we expect that these techniques
can reduce or eliminate the need for a symmetry constraint with machine-
learning reconstruction.
Third, when magnetometer data is available, it is very useful for deter-
mining the quadrant of an angle. Incorporating a magnetometer logistic
regression model into the crowdsourced method can reduce or eliminate its
search process for disambiguating quadrants, making it scale well to objects
with many segments. However, good-quality magnetometer data is not al-
ways available: the data may have been captured during a phone call, or it
might not have been possible to place the phone close enough to the machin-
ery’s motors. In those situations, we believe that more sophisticated signal
processing techniques may be able to pick out the secondary tones that we see
in the patterns of spectrograms, and use them to disambiguate the quadrant
of an angle. This enhancement can be used with both methods. Until then,
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Figure 6.14: A comparison of the two reconstruction methods tested on the
star shape
the machine learning method could take advantage of the search process used
by the crowdsourced method, when magnetometer data is not available.
Finally, non-expert users can provide useful guidance for both methods.
For example, we could hear someone clicking a pen in one of the machine
recordings. The click was quite distinct from ordinary machine sounds, and
we knew that it did not indicate a machine event such as an angle change; but
signal processing techniques or a regression model might have been fooled by
it. More generally, when machine learning and signal processing fail due to
irrelevant background or foreground noise, a human may be able to salvage
the reconstruction.
6.5 Recommendations
Playback Defense. We designed and tested a defense that obfuscates
the acoustic emissions from manufacturing equipment by playing record-
ings during production. Since noise removal has been studied extensively
[83, 84, 85, 86, 87], instead of playing a random signal, we chose to play
recordings of variations of the part being produced that have small dimen-
sional deviations from it. The attacker would still be able to determine the
general shape of item being manufactured, which may provide situational
awareness about a manufacturer’s capabilities and the current activities in
their factory. On the other hand, obfuscation can make it harder for the
attacker to separate the target audio stream from the others and reconstruct
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Segment / Segment Abs. Angle Abs.
Angle Length (mm) Error Size Error
Crowdsourced
1 31.4916 -0.1716 36 0
2 21.4884 1.9316 324 0
3 10.3737 0.9163 36 0
4 10.7442 1.2958 324 0
5 10.3737 1.6663 36 0
6 10.3737 0.9163 324 0
7 22.9704 0.4496 36 0
8 28.5277 2.7923 324 0
9 15.5606 0.6594 36 0
10 15.5606 0.6594 324 0
ML Without Constraints
1 11.27 -0.1716 36 Abs
2 76.70 1.9316 324 Abs
3 45.80 0.9163 36 Abs
4 45.80 1.2958 324 Abs
5 41.80 1.6663 36 Abs
6 42.40 0.9163 324 Abs
7 78.40 0.4496 36 Abs
8 11.20 2.7923 324 Abs
9 54.00 0.6594 36 Abs
10 70.30 0.6594 324 Abs
ML With Constraints
1 10.99 -0.1716 35.8 Abs
2 75.17 1.9316 323.8 Abs
3 41.57 0.9163 36 Abs
4 41.57 1.2958 324 Abs
5 41.57 1.6663 35.8 Abs
6 41.57 0.9163 324 Abs
7 75.17 0.4496 36 Abs
8 10.99 2.7923 325.2 Abs
9 59.77 0.6594 35.8 Abs
10 59.77 0.6594 323.8 Abs
Table 6.2: As-reconstructed measurements and error for the B-2 plane on
the 3D printer
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the object’s exact dimensions or process parameters. Because often the small
details of the process or design are exactly the information that an attacker
would like to obtain, it is worthwhile to make them harder to ferret out.
For example, in high-value manufacturing, there may be a hundred wrong
ways to make an object, and one way to make it right. Burying the golden
needle in a stack of hay could greatly raise the cost of finding it, though
this kind of obfuscation has inherent limits: since every speaker has a unique
acoustic signature, in principle a haystack of played-back recordings could
be identified as such and peeled away, revealing the needle within. But if the
obfuscation greatly increases the cost of the attack, it will make many kinds
of manufacturing espionage not worth the price.
To test this hypothesis, we selected eleven similar turbine blade profiles and
scaled them so that the print time was approximately the same. The first ten
were recorded as they printed individually. The audio recordings from these
prints were combined and aligned with a slight stagger at the beginning, and
the resultant composite audio was played while the eleventh profile printed.
Analysis of the composite audio shows that while the fundamental frequencies
were reproduced, the harmonics were lost during the combination step. In
the eleventh recording, the fundamentals from the first ten turbine blades
obscure the data necessary to reconstruct the eleventh, but the harmonics
from the eleventh appear clearly; this harmonic data is sufficient for an audio
reconstruction. In future work, we will experiment with combining the audio
tracks in a way that preserves the harmonics and matches other features
such as amplitude, in order to obfuscate the recording to a state that will
significantly raise the cost of reconstruction.
Electromagnetic. Limiting the electromagnetic field generated by manu-
facturing machinery can raise the cost of reconstruction, by making it expen-
sive or impossible for reconstruction methods to determine which quadrant
an angle of travel lies in.
Since magnetometer readings drop off with the cube of the distance from
the source, one option is to increase the size of a machine’s enclosure. We
tested this hypothesis with a large high-end new-model mill at the Digital
Manufacturing Design and Innovation Institute, and found that when the
phone was placed on the machine’s enclosure, the magnetometer was too far
away from the motors to pick up useful readings.
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When it is not practical to enlarge an enclosure, improving motor shielding
can help. For example, recent research on interference shielding has shown
that polymer-matrix composites are effective for electromagnetic interference
shielding, due to their light weight, resistance to corrosion, flexibility, and
modest cost. These composites have been used for many purposes [88, 89,
90, 91]. Additionally, researchers have shown that composites such as carbon
nanofiber-polymer can provide effective shielding for the frequency range of
8.2−12.4 [92]. We suggest the use of composites to cover the stepper motors
in manufacturing equipment with a shield thin enough that the motor is not
damaged by excessive heat retention, but thick enough to protect it from
broadcasting sensitive information to an adversary.
With measures such as these, in the long run we expect that manufactur-
ers will be able to take measures to reduce side-channel leakages of audio
and electromagnetic field information on their factory floors. Until then,
manufacturers might want to ask their employees and vendors to leave their
phones at the door.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
7.1 Conclusion
We have presented a distributed record and replay system for the Emergency
Room. Our system supports both clock synchronization with local NTP and
logical ordering of events with a projection protocol during recording. During
replay, our system employs a novel token mechanism to schedule ordered
replay of the recorded distributed events. This platforms, further batches
tokens to reduce bandwidth requirements and replay overhead. We have
evaluated our token scheduling overhead and found it to be acceptable.
Our prototype implementation assumes the executors are individual ma-
chines that communicate through the network with the main scheduler. In
future work, we plan to implement the executors as virtual machines running
on the same platform as the main scheduler, implement the main scheduler
as part of that platform’s hypervisor, and handle the token exchange protocol
using hypercalls.
New technologies applied to medical devices have expanded the attack win-
dow for adversaries, creating a wider range of exploits. Without adequate
audit, we are fundamentally incapable of fully understanding the vulnerabil-
ities that attack exploits.
During this thesis process, we identified several vulnerabilities of current
medical devices and presented a distributed record and replay platform for
future medical devices. We propose several possible implementations for our
platform and discussed the challenges in implementing them.
We believe that distributed record and replay capabilities serve as the
foundation of defenses. With the ability to replay certain events, we can
provide a precise platform for analysis of device behavior during operation. In
addition, this ability can be used for an educational and academic purposes,
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since the replay can provide a specific case study or provide capacity for
collective analysis.
7.2 Discussion
Though issues with medical device security have been highlighted, our solu-
tion lacks the ability to completely prevent a cyber-attack on an Emergency
Room. On the other hand, DRnR can provide the following capabilities to
an Emergency Room. First and foremost, our solution is able to identify
faulty devices in an Emergency Room. This capability allows IT administra-
tors, forensics experts, and medical staff to take action immediately in case
of an emergency. Additionally, record and replay can provide a higher level
of granularity for forensics experts due to its ability to replay each system
call individually, both on a single machine or in a distributed model. The
goal of DRnR is to identify the faulty machine at the level of system call,
thus specifically we can block the faulty application.
It could be reasonably contended that DRnR seems very futuristic. This
argument is valid due to constraints that exist in the contemporary Emer-
gency Room as well as medical devices. For example, not every medical
device has, nor plans to run on, an operating system. That being said, as
technology advances, we are facing higher requirements for some type of
operating system to allow developers to expand the capabilities of their ap-
plication as well as allowing the medical device to communicate with other
devices in an Emergency Room. As we have discussed earlier, the future of
Emergency Rooms and the safety of the patient is surely dependent on the
technology in the operating room; the ability to provide vital signs between
devices to act immediately without human error is crucial. We are predicting
that in the near future the majority of actions in an Emergency Room will
be fully automated. This automation requires devices with communication
capabilities and fast acting local logic. In short, using an operating system
in future medical devices is unavoidable.
Furthermore, Emergency Rooms are not ready to incorporate such tech-
nology right away. Constraints such as standards, network capabilities, and
staff training are a few of the obstacles that prevent solutions such as DRnR
to enter the implementation phase anytime soon. In section 7.3 we will
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elaborate some of the techniques that might assist the deployment of our
platform.
7.3 Future Work
This section is dedicated to provide an overview of possible directions for
the future work in regards to distributed record and replay systems. The
notion of record and replay, especially when a distributed model is considered,
requires an extensive amount of work in order to be able to cover the majority
of the embedded devices. Thus, we are making our proposal in the following
sections.
7.3.1 Future of Distributed Record and Replay
Record and replay is the most important part of our audit platform. It must
incur low space and performance overhead and be resilient against attacks.
There are several challenges that must be solved for record and replay.
First, the performance overhead added by the recorder must be small, and
the log growth rate must also be small. Second, we must determine whether
the record-and-replay itself is vulnerable to attack.
As for our future work, we will first build a prototype of our proposed au-
dit platform. Next, we will validate our prototype with a number of simple
devices. Finally, we will validate on existing medical devices such as infu-
sion pumps. During our implementation, there are several issues need to be
addressed:
• How to solve the challenges of record-and-replay mentioned above.
• How to apply the record-and-replay system to ARM architecture.
• How to efficiently store and transfer the record logs.
• How to maintain the integrity of recorded logs since the logs could be
modified during the transmission over the network and to the master
replay.
In addition, the following are some interesting future directions we could
possibly take:
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• Applying the distributed record and replay platform to other embedded
devices where record and replay in parallel is essential.
• Designing a record-and-replay system for real-time systems with feed-
back loops.
• Developing a query mechanism which allows the medical staff and non-
professional users to generate certain queries. An example couple be
”Show all the medical devices which were having the latest firmware at
time.”
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